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PREFACE 
This dissertation is the culmination of an ongoing 
interest in the two philosophers who are its subject. As a 
child, I knew of John Dewey as the man who had something to 
do with the plan of the elementary education that I experi-
enced in Oak Park, Illinois. Later, at the University of 
Chicago, I had many friends who were the "products" of the 
Laboratory School, and although we never thought we might be 
influenced by Dewey, we discovered surprisingly mutual ways 
of thinking and living as students. Later, as a student at a 
British teacher training college, I amazed myself and others 
by the chauvinism with which I defended "Deweyan" ideas of 
education in a democracy. At the same time, I also enthusi-
astically embraced and later applied in my own teaching 
project method in an integrated curriculum, even though 
unaware that the "new" techniques owed much to Dewey's ideas 
as manifested by William Heard Kilpatrick. 
In 1985, I began graduate study in the Philosophy 
Department at Loyola University of Chicago with a view to 
concentrating on applied ethics. studying ancient, classical 
modern, and modern analytic philosophy with little or no 
previous background was arduous, but I began my second year 
with a course on John Dewey, during which reading his Quest 
for Certainty put my own struggles with "moral theory" in 
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perspective. I also discovered that understanding different 
"philosophies" was made easier by comparing and contrasting 
common themes found in the work of any two philosophers. 
Thus, I wrote about such things as autonomy in Kant and 
Rawls and, for a course on the topic of virtue mounted by 
Thomas Wren from the Philosophy Department and Walter 
Krolikowski from the School of Education, virtue in Aristo-
tle and Rawls. Still pursuing my interest in applied ethics, 
I wrote for that first Dewey course a piece on "Work as 
Art," the philosophical underpinnings of which drew heavily 
on Aristotle in support of John Dewey's views on work in a 
technological society. 
During my second year of graduate study, I registered 
for a philosophy of education course with Fr. Krolikowski, 
first, in order to bone up on Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey for 
my master's oral to complete the general program in philoso-
phy; second, in order to get a better taste of Dewey, whose 
views were compelling; and, finally, in order to have the 
opportunity to work with Walter Krolikowski. It was over 
coffee after one of those classes that one of us said to the 
other -- neither Fr. Krolikowski nor I can recall which of 
us it was -- "Dewey is really very Aristotelian," to which 
the other replied, simply, "Yes." Two years later, I 
completed the Philosophy Department's master's program in 
applied ethics with a paper on virtue in Dewey and Aristo-
tle, produced in another of Fr. Krolikowski's courses for 
iv 
which we read both the 1908 and the 1932 editions of James 
TUfts' and John Dewey's Ethics. I then entered the doctoral 
program in the School of Education's Department of Educa-
tional Leadership and Policy Studies with a concentration in 
the philosophy of education. My interest in applied ethics 
continues, as, after all, at the end of Chapter 24 in 
pemocracy and Education, John Dewey did assert "that 
philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately 
conducted practice." 
As I said at the beginning of this Preface, my 
interest in Dewey and Aristotle is ongoing, and this 
dissertation represents to me one culmination, that is, an 
"end-in-view" of formal academic study. 
v 
VITA 
The author, Patricia Alison Louise Haggard, is the 
younger daughter of the late Ashley Peabody Haggard and 
Barbara Alison Rogers Haggard Matteson. She was born in Oak 
Park, Illinois, where she obtained her elementary and 
secondary education in the public schools. 
After working as a lighting and set designer in 
theaters-in both the United States and abroad, she entered 
Bulmershe College, Reading, England, and obtained her 
British teaching qualification in 1967. She taught all 
subjects including remedial classes in primary and secondary 
modern schools. 
In 1969, she returned to Chicago and was employed as 
a writer and editor in educational publishing, as the drama 
and restaurant critic on several publications, and as a 
building rehab carpenter and painter. She continued her 
interest in theater by designing and constructing sets for 
local community groups. 
She returned to college in 1979, receiving the degree 
of Bachelor of Arts in liberal studies at DePaul University 
in 1980 and the degree of Master of Arts in religious 
studies at Mundelein College in 1982. In 1985, she enrolled 
at Loyola University Chicago and received the degrees of 
Master of Arts in philosophy in 1987 and in applied ethics 
in 1989. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . 
PREFACE 
VITA .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Primary source . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Secondary sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Philosophical systems of Dewey and Aristotle 
A structuralist approach . . • . . • . • . . . . 
CHAPTER I: COMPARING DEWEY AND ARISTOTLE ...... . 
Review of the literature . . . . . . . . . . 
The works of Aristotle . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 
The works of John Dewey . . . . . . 
The 1908 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The 1932 Ethics . . . . . . . . . 
CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY ......•......... 
Dewey's Pattern of Inquiry . . . . . . . . . 
Toulmin's method . • . . . . ......... . 
Inductive and deductive reasoning . . . . . 
Dewey's Warranted Assertibility . . ..... 
Achinstein's concepts of evidence and 
probability . • • . . . . . . . . . . . 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . • 
CHAPTER III: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE "ARISTOTELIAN"? . 
Aristotle's naturalism . . . . . . . . . . .. . 
Aristotle's formalism ............. . 
Aristotle's structuralistic functionalism ... . 
John Dewey and Greek philosophy . . . . . 
Dewey and Hegel . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 
Dewey's naturalism . . . . . . . . .... . 
Dewey's formalism • • . . . . . . . . . .. . 
Dewey's structuralistic functionalism ....•. 
Development of Dewey's thought . . . . . . . .. 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
vii 
ii 
iii 
vi 
vii 
1 
1 
2 
3 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
14 
15 
17 
19 
23 
27 
29 
33 
33 
34 
36 
37 
41 
43 
44 
45 
46 
48 
CHAPI'ER IV: ETHICS AS CONDUCT OR CHARACTER . . • . 
Morality of the human act • • • • • • • . • • 
customary morality • . • • • • • • • • • . 
Reflective morality • • • • • • • • • • • 
Good as the end of the moral act • • • . 
Rules of conduct and character formation . • • • 
Character defined • • • . • • . • . • 
Habit and character • • • • • • . . • 
Character and the Good • • • • . • . . • . • . • 
Character and ethics • • • • • • • . . . . . • . 
CHAPI'ER V: IS DEWEY'S CONCEPI' OF VIRTUE ARISTOTELIAN? 
Virtue in moral theory . . . . • . . • . . . • . 
Acquiring virtue • . . . • . • . • . • . 
Virtue as practices . . . . . . • . . . • 
Virtue defined • • . . • . • • . 
Process of reflective morality . . • . 
Conclusion • . . • • • . • . . . . 
CHAPI'ER VI: ETHICS IN SOCIETY •. 
Society and the individual . • . 
Society as educator • . • • . • • 
Society as a milieu . • . 
Aristotle on friendship . . . • . 
Dewey's view of ethics in society 
CHAPTER VII: DEWEY'S AND ARISTOTLE'S TELEOLOGY . . .. 
Aristotle's archai and logos •...•....... 
Dewey's reconstruction of experience .•.• 
Reconstruction of experience and social reality • 
Is reconstruction of experience teleological? ..•• 
Ultimate ends • • • • • • • • • . • . • . • . • . 
What is the ultimate end for Aristotle? . . . • . 
Growth as the ultimate end for Dewey • . . • • . 
Eudaimonia as the ultimate end for Aristotle 
Conclusion • • • . . . • . . . • • 
CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
viii 
50 
54 
55 
57 
58 
62 
64 
65 
66 
67 
69 
72 
76 
78 
80 
84 
86 
88 
88 
89 
91 
95 
97 
99 
100 
101 
104 
108 
110 
111 
111 
113 
115 
117 
120 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to show that John 
Dewey's 1932 Ethicsl is Aristotelian. I will try to estab-
lish that Dewey's thought is congruent or consistent with 
that of Aristotle, in particular, with Aristotle's thought 
as found in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Primary source 
The subject matter in this work will concentrate on 
the 200-odd pages that make up Dewey's share of a revised 
text he wrote with James H. Tufts. Dewey and Tufts wrote the 
original edition in 1906, but, as will be seen, their 
separate contributions can easily be distinguished by the 
organization of both editions. This dissertation will not 
deal with Tufts' material nor will it speculate on whether 
the close collaboration of the two men might have resulted 
in some overlap of their ideas, whichever one actually 
happened to express them. 
1 The edition I will be using is the twenty-seventh 
volume of The Collected Works of John Dewey. 1882-1953, ed. 
Jo Ann Boydston, The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 7: 1932, 
Introduction by Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flower (Carbon-
dale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985). The form of 
footnote reference will be: Dewey, 1932 Ethics. 
1 
While there will be occasional reference to the 1908 
Ethics, this dissertation is in no way intended to compare 
Dewey's views in the two works. A note by Abraham Edel and 
Elizabeth Flower in the Introduction to the definitive 
edition of the 1932 Ethics to the effect that such an 
undertaking "is at least complex enough for post-doctoral 
research, 11 2 somewhat piqued my interest, but not enough to 
engage in such a study. 
Secondary sources 
There is a vast amount of secondary reference 
material on Aristotle and on Dewey. It is also easy enough 
to find material, both in the field of education and in the 
field of philosophy, that refers to the work of both men. In 
the area of ethics, however, while there is an abundance of 
secondary sources on Aristotle, there is much less on Dewey. 
Discussions of Dewey's thought on ethics refer to a great 
number of his writings; they rarely refer to those works 
entitled Ethics. Further, what few references there are deal 
almost exclusively with the 1908 edition.3 
2 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. viii. 
3 Except for Darnell Rucker's article, "Dewey's Ethics" 
in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), and 
excerpts in James Gouinlock, The Moral Writings of John 
Dewey (New York: Macmillan, 1976), I have gleaned only one 
further reference to the 1932 Ethics, a note in J.E. Tiles, 
Dewey (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 231. 
2 
There are three possible reasons for the paucity of 
references to the 1932 Ethics. First, the 1908 Ethics was 
written as a textbook, and, as such, scholars may be less 
likely to take notice of a joint effort by Dewey and Tufts. 
second, although the revision in 1932 was almost total, the 
Ethics was still only a cowritten textbook and received the 
attention of only six reviewers.4 Although it remained in 
print until 1952, scholars seemingly did not consider it a 
fruitful source of Dewey's ideas. Finally, there is the 
matter of "fashion." Dewey has been out of fashion in 
philosophy, if not in education. Ethics has been out of 
fashion in education, if not in philosophy. Both Dewey and 
ethics are becoming fashionable again, and it is just my 
good fortune to have picked a field, in both topic and 
primary source, that is relatively unplowed. 
Philosophical systems of Dewey and Aristotle 
This study is not a discussion of the systems 
developed by each philosopher. Irwin argues that "Aristotle 
changes his mind on some fundamental issues about the nature 
df his argument .•. [even though] his later works develop 
views that are connected enough to count as systematic."5 
4 See Bibliography. The SIU Press' definitive edition 
of the 1932 Ethics, [LW: 7) in The Collected Works of John 
Dewey was reviewed by Darnell Rucker, Journal of Social 
Philosophy, Volume XVII, Number 3 Fall 1987, pp. 64-66. 
5 Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 480. 
3 
something very similar may be true of Dewey, as Horace 
Kallen says; 
•.. if you wanted Dewey to state a system, he'd have 
to contradict himself. He'd have to set up a number 
of fixed points and a structural order of the 
universe, and deny practically all the fundamental 
concepts with which he is identified. He thinks the 
functional thoughts, and he writes the functional 
thoughts. And it doesn't matter what field you enter 
into .•. all [of those other fields] turn on the fact 
that they want to use rigidities, to deny process.6 
well, then, the two philosophers do not seem to have an 
overall system of philosophy. Do they each have a systematic 
ethical theory? 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle provides a "most 
detailed analysis of Greek attitudes and aspirations, 
modified and criticized from his own point of view."7 His 
philosophical approach is the method of dialectic brought to 
bear on any issue, including the moral life. John Dewey 
maintains: 
No fundamental difference exists between systematic 
moral theory ••• and the reflection an individual 
engages in when he attempts to find general prin-
ciples which shall direct and justify his conduct.a 
It seems, then, that each philosopher has a way of 
going about ethical decision-making, but, as indicated and 
6 Corliss Lamont, ed., Dialogue on John Dewey (New 
York: Horizon Press, 1959), pp. 51-52. 
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Terence Irwin, tr. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), p. xi. This translation will 
be my primary source but other translators will be indicated 
when used. All references to the works of Aristotle will be 
by Bekker numbers which are standard in all translations. 
8 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 163. 
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as we will see further, neither has a "prescriptive" set of 
rules about what one ought and ought not do. Morton White is 
critical of what he believes is an attempt by Dewey to 
derive normative ethical statements from descriptive ones 
making an "ought" from an "is" -- but White is mistaken;9 
Dewey does no such thing. In fact, the "moral theory" of 
either philosopher is beyond easy access by analytic 
methods. Rather, the entire structures of Aristotle's and 
Dewey's ethics need to be examined to determine if there are 
any points of similarity. Those points can then be presented 
for further comparison and discussion. 
A structuralist approach 
What I propose is not so much a method of analyzing 
the ethics of Aristotle and of John Dewey as a way of 
examining and discussing similar points. These points of 
similarity overlap in many ways--much as members of a single 
human family may resemble one another. A family resemblance 
may be as obvious as red hair and freckles, or, less 
obvious, the timbre of voice or the tendency to weep with 
anger. Some points of resemblance can be traced to genetics 
and others to environment. Thus, a structural approach to 
ethics must take into consideration not just intellectual 
and psychological elements but also biological and physical 
9 Morton G. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and 
Lewis," The Philosophical Review, LVIII, 1949, pp. 321-29. 
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elements, including the variety of actual circumstances in 
which both the individual and the society exist. 
In brief, the structure of ethics that is examined in 
this dissertation is comprised of the activity of human 
persons in terms of both society and the individual. All 
human activity is informed by the character and conduct of 
the individual in and by society, just as the character and 
conduct of society is informed by individuals. Further, the 
structure of ethics is also comprised of processes or the 
operational means by which individuals and society function, 
such as Dewey's reflective morality and Aristotle's virtue. 
Finally, there are ways of "becoming" by habituation and 
approbation, that must be included in the structure of 
ethics. None of these elements is inclusive of any other; 
some may occasionally be in opposition; but all, and perhaps 
some more not presented here, are essential to the whole. 
These particular elements have been chosen because they are 
each important to any description of human activity, and can 
also be identified in both Dewey's and Aristotle's ethics. 
My task, then, is to see how all of these elements 
contribute to the wholeness of Dewey's and Aristotle's 
respective ethical structures, and, if their structures are 
sufficiently similar, to argue to the conclusion that 
Dewey's 1932 Ethics is Aristotelian. 
6 
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CHAPTER I 
COMPARING DEWEY AND ARISTOTLE 
An examination of the relation between Aristotle and 
John Dewey must begin with a discussion of their works that 
are available to us. To attempt a comparison of the ethical 
thought of two men whose lives were separated by more than 
2000 years is daunting, particularly because, as one 
philosopher lived so long ago and the other lived so long, 
there is an enormous body of literature that deals with the 
thought and ideas of each man. In those works concerned with 
John Dewey, there are many tantalizing references to 
Aristotle {occasionally, by contemporary writers, the other 
way around). In Chapter II, I will call upon many of the 
biographers of and the commentators on Dewey's life and 
thought to attempt a case for Dewey's Aristotelianism. This 
chapter deals with the works of my two protagonists and with 
narrowing the focus to Dewey's ethical theory in the 1932 
Ethics. Such a narrow focus cannot be attempted with regard 
to Aristotle. Although the Nicomachean Ethics does provide 
the substantial points of reference, it is the Politics that 
provides the "proving ground" for Aristotle's ethical theory 
as part of a larger political science.l 
1 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 24. 
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Review of the literature 
The reference material for this dissertation can be 
found in the bibliography. A number of these sources will be 
quoted, and these references also will be found in the 
footnotes. I would like, however, to call attention to the 
definitive edition of John Dewey's work published by the 
Dewey Center in Carbondale and Southern Illinois University 
Press under the editorship of Dr. Jo Ann Boydston.2 The 
Collected Works of John Dewey consists of five volumes of 
the Early Works, fifteen volumes of the Middle Works, and, 
when completed, sixteen volumes of the Later Works. All 
volumes have excellent introductions by contemporary 
philosophers and educators. Access to such a collection 
makes the writing task much easier and provides the neces-
sary reference support for several works of biography 
titled, simply, John Dewey. 
In another work, titled simply Aristotle, 3 John 
Herman Randall asks many more questions than he answers, 
but, in doing so, he makes some intriguing references to 
John Dewey. 4 Randall also reminds us that Aristotle's work 
2 References to volumes other than the 1908 and 1932 
Ethics in this Collected Works edition will take the short 
form [MW: 5), and accompany references to earlier editions. 
3 John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1960). 
4 Ibid. Referring to the different forms and versions 
of Aristotle's thought, Randall says 11 ••• it appears quite as 
useless to attempt to harmonize all the writings [of 
Aristotle] ... as to endeavor to harmonize, say, the early 
8 
is fragmentary and repetitious.5 While the latter part of 
this description may in fact be applied to John Dewey, his 
work is by no means fragmentary -- we have it all -- from 
1882 to 1953. 
The works of Aristotle 
Unlike Dewey's work that was written, or rather 
typed, by the author and published in his lifetime, 
Aristotle's work has come to us in the form of brief 
treatises and lecture notes, taken down and copied first by 
his students, and arranged, preserved, and rearranged into 
the form that was finally settled in the nineteenth century. 
There is no need to enter into a discussion of which works 
are more or less "Aristotelian" than others. 
Not all of the Aristotelian concepts to which I refer 
come from the Nicomachean Ethics. That is, when Aristotle 
says that thus and so is the case in the Ethics, it often 
will be necessary to refer to another treatise, such as the 
Politics or Posterior Analytics to discover what he says 
about ~ thus and so comes to be the case. In addition, and 
although I rarely quote him, Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on 
Hegelian writings of John Dewey with Experience and Nature 
and his subsequent books." p. 27. 
5 Aristotle himself makes reference to digression in 
his account at ~' 1095bl4. 
9 
~he Nichomachean Ethics 6 has helped me clarify some of my 
own thinking about Aristotle. 
The works of John Dewey 
While this paper deals specifically with Dewey's 
ethical theory in the 1932 Ethics, it is still necessary to 
place that work in the context of Dewey's corpus of philo-
sophical and social thought. Between 1925 and 1934, Dewey 
entered the seventh decade of his life and retired from 
full-time teaching at Columbia. During this time, he also 
reached what some have considered the "height of his powers 
and influence."7 He gave lectures and speeches, wrote 
literally hundreds of essays and articles, and published 
four major works -- Experience and Nature (1925), The Public 
and Its Problems (1927), The Quest for Certainty (1929), and 
Art as Experience (1934). In addition, he was engaged 
sporadically throughout this period in writing LQgic: The 
Theory of Inquiry (1938).8 About halfway through this 
extraordinarily active period, Dewey also undertook the 
6 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean 
Ethics (Chicago: Regnery, 1964). 
1 Paul Kurtz, The Collected Works of John Dewey, The 
Later Works. 1925-1953 Volume 5: 1929-1930, ed. Jo Ann 
Boydston. Introduction by Paul Kurtz (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1985). 
8 Textual Commentary in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in 
The Collected Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The 
Later Works. 1925-1953, Volume 12: 1938, Introduction by 
Ernest Nagel (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1985), p. 534. 
10 
revision of the textbook Ethics, which he had originally 
written with James H. Tufts in 1908. In 1931, when the 
revision was begun, John Dewey had been widowed for five 
years and was seventy-two years old. 
The 1908 Ethics 
Dewey and Tufts had been colleagues at both the 
University of Michigan and the University of Chicago. Tufts 
remained at Chicago until his retirement in 1930. After 
Dewey's move to Columbia University in 1904, the two men 
undertook to produce a textbook on ethics, presenting the 
ideas they had developed both jointly and independently 
during the years at Chicago.9 It was agreed that the work 
would be in three parts. Tufts wrote the historical Part I: 
The Beginnings and Growth of Morality; Dewey, Part II: 
Theory of the Moral Life and the first two chapters of Part 
III: The World of Action; and Tufts, the remainder of the 
book. Published in 1908, the Ethics became a popular 
university textbooklO and was reprinted at least twenty-five 
times before 1930.ll In that year, although it is not clear 
9 Textual Commentary, Ethics in The Collected Works of 
John oewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Middle Works. 1899-
12..2.!, Volume 5: 1908, Introduction by Charles L. Stevenson 
(Carbondale: southern Illinois University Press, 1985), pp. 
549-550. 
10 James T. Farrell recalls using Dewey and TUfts'l908 
Ethics as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago in 
the early 1920s. Dialogue on John Dewey, p. 131. 
11 Textual Commentary, 1908 Ethics, p. 553. 
11 
what prompted them to do so,12 Tufts and Dewey undertook a 
revision of the textbook. 
The 1932 Ethics 
Tufts made changes in three chapters (1, 3, and 6) 
and added an entire new chapter on the Romans (8) in his 
first part of the revision. There are still nine chapters in 
Part I, but, in addition to the new chapter, what was 
Chapter 8 in the 1906 Ethics, "The Modern Period," has been 
"almost entirely rewritten" and become Chapter 9 in the 1932 
Ethics, "Factors and Trends in the Modern Moral Conscious-
ness.1113 The old Chapter 9, "A General Comparison of 
customary and Reflective Morality," no longer appears in the 
first part. 
Although there is no comment, much less explanation, 
in either the Preface to the 1932 Edition or in the 
otherwise excellent Textual Commentary as to why this was 
done, the topics of customary and reflective morality are 
taken up by Dewey in Part II. One can only assume that as 
Part II was "recast; the method of presentation ... changed 
and the material practically all rewritten,nl4 the two 
12 I speculate that this may have been a "retirement 
project" for the two men, perhaps planned by Dewey. Tufts 
was three years Dewey's junior and apparently ill at about 
the time of his retirement (see Textual Commentary, 1932 
Ethics, p. 473), but he recovered to write his share of the 
text and died in 1942, aged 80. 
13 Preface, 1932 Ethics, p. 4. 
l4 Ibid. 
12 
author• agreed to this rearrangement of material from Tufts' 
section to Dewey's. In fact, their close collaboration makes 
it impossible to distinguish which of them contributed which 
ideas in the original arrangement. One can, however, suggest 
that these topics more properly belong in a section on the 
theory of morality than in the historical section. As for 
Part III, the entire section "with the exception of [five] 
pages ... is new. 11 15 
Part II and the first two chapters of Part III are 
Dewey's contribution to the 1932 Ethics and will be the 
focus of this dissertation, although some reference will be 
made to the 1908 Ethics in support of ideas in the later 
work. However, I will not enter into any discussion of the 
differences found between the 1908 and 1932 versions, as 
there is ample evidence that Dewey revised and rewrote all 
the material. The later edition, therefore, can be said to 
constitute his considered ideas on ethics as of 1932. 
15 Ibid. 
13 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter is an attempt to construct a methodology 
for the comparison of Dewey's and Aristotle's ethical 
thought. While it cannot be denied that there may be some 
similarities in the thinking of these two philosophers, such 
similarities cannot be argued solely on the basis of words 
used. Neither philosopher, and one did not write in English, 
offers examples of applications of moral theory whose 
congruency is immediately apparent by comparing terms. Nor 
is it possible to argue analogical likeness. That is, even 
if th~ attributes, circumstances, or effects of the moral 
"theory" of each philosopher were found to be analogous, it 
would also be necessary to consider moral "practice" or the 
processes of moral thinking and action in society, which 
would require setting up a whole new lot of analogies 
because of the vast historical distance between the two 
philosophers. Since the matter at hand is to establish 
whether Dewey's 1932 Ethics is Aristotelian, one can only 
identify.a few points that the two philosophers seem to have 
in common and connect those points with processes they 
appear to have in common. If the resulting structures of 
points and processes are similar, that similarity will 
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enable one to argue that it is possible to show that Dewey's 
1932 E~hics is Aristotelian. 
For a method with which to compare the ideas of Dewey 
and Aristotle, I propose to take Dewey's own method of 
inquiry as a general framework. This chapter will offer 
material from Stephen Toulmin for specific method, consider 
Dewey's view of the places of inductive and deductive 
reasoning, and draw on Peter Achinstein for a discussion of 
what constitutes evidence and probability. Finally, Dewey's 
concept of warranted assertibility will be presented in 
support of my methodology. 
The objective is to set up a method whereby the 
identified points and processes in the structure of ethical 
thought of Dewey and of Aristotle can be examined using the 
same methodological approach to discover what, if any, 
similarities can be found and the extent to which such 
structural similarities lead to the confirmation of thesis 
of this dissertation. 
Dewey's Pattern of Inquiry 
The objective of inquiry, according to John Dewey, is 
to resolve an indeterminate situation into a unified one. 
The first steps are to identify the "problem situation" and 
to determine a "problem solution." Reasoning or rational 
discourse determines the meaning of the situation, and that 
situation's relation to ideas that arise as further hypothe-
15 
ses are developed. This operational relation between facts 
and meanings can then be subject to methods of common sense 
and scientific inquiry depending on subject matter rather 
than any basic logical forms or relations.l Propositions 
about subject contents or facts thus undergo independent 
development just as do propositions about meanings and their 
relations. Subject contents can be called material means and 
meanings and their relations called procedural means, it 
being remembered that both are operational since they are 
both means of determining the final situation and judgment.2 
Dewey uses the term "relation" to describe the matter 
of inquiry, defines it, and redefines it throughout the text 
of the Logic. According to Gail Kennedy's rather succinct 
summary, there are four key types of relation in inquiry, 
connection or involvement, inference, implication, and 
reference.3 The first two are existential, the actual 
subject matter of the problem situation is connected to the 
meaning that may be inferred from that subject matter or 
data. The third term, implication, refers to the relation 
between the meanings of various data, and the last term 
designates the relating or reference of such meanings to 
1 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, The Later Works. 
1925-1953, Volume 12: 1938 (Carbondale: southern Illinois 
University Press, 1986), [LW: 12] pp. 108-122. 
2 Ibid., p. 139. 
3 Gail Kennedy, "Dewey's Logic and Theory of Know-
ledge," in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, pp. 74-75. 
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existential subject matter. What inquiry is concerned with 
is the threefold correspondence between a relational 
structure of data and meanings and a set of inferences 
"which in their turn depend upon a complex of brute existen-
tial connections or involvements."4 Or, in Dewey's classic 
definition of inquiry: 
Inquiry is the controlled or direct transformation of 
an indeterminate situation into one that is so 
determinate in its constituent distinctions and 
relations as to convert the elements of the original 
situation into a unified whole.5 
While this is a summary of what this dissertation sets out 
to do, transform points and processes into unified and 
comparable structures, Dewey does not really clarify the 
steps by which the investigator treats material in the 
process of inquiry. For this, one needs to find a more 
straightforward method for the undertaking, and I have 
chosen the work of Stephen Toulmin exemplify such a method. 
Toulmin's method 
The thesis of this piece of work makes the assertion 
that Dewey's Ethics is Aristotelian. In order to establish 
grounds for such an assertion it is necessary to make 
certain claims about the similarity or correspondence of 
particular concepts and ideas that are common to Dewey and 
Aristotle. The method by which I propose to do this in 
4 Ibid. 
5 Dewey, Logic, [LW: 12] p. 108. 
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subsequent chapters will be to follow the pattern or 
structure of argument laid out by Toulmin.6 
Each chapter will make a claim and data will be 
gathered relevant to that claim. Primary data will consist 
of "facts," that is, what is actually stated by Dewey and by 
Aristotle on specific matters. Secondary data will consist 
of what others have said about Dewey's and Aristotle's 
statements on these matters. These are the "material means" 
of Dewey's pattern of inquiry. 
Then, based on these data, I will offer "general, 
hypothetical statements, which can act as bridges, and 
authorize the particular argument" to which the claim of a 
chapter is committed. 7 These "warrants" take the form of 
assertions about the data as, for instance, both Dewey and 
Aristotle appear to say the same things about the nature of 
habit. Warrants also are subject to qualifiers, such as the 
difficulty of comparison of the terse clarity of Aristotle's 
text to the sometimes convoluted density of Dewey's writing. 
Some rebuttals to the warrants also will be pointed out and 
argued to some conclusion, generally on the basis of 
additional facts that "can serve as further data, or they 
can be cited to confirm or rebut the applicability of a 
6 Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1964). 
7 Toulmin, p. 98. 
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warrant."8 Arguing warrants, qualifiers, and rebuttals are 
the "procedural means" of Dewey's pattern of inquiry. 
Toulmin gives a very compelling argument for the im-
possibility of making a distinction between "conclusions 
[that] can be inferred necessarily or certainly and those 
conclusions [that] can be inferred only possibly or with 
probability. 11 9 He argues that the attempts of some theorists 
to identify analytic arguments with the former and substan-
tial arguments with the latter are unjustified. It seems 
appropriate to digress briefly at this point to a short 
discussion of formal reasoning and to off er some of John 
Dewey's consideration of the matter. 
Inductive and deductive reasoning 
Dewey says that while our moral judgments are often 
intuitive, such intuitive judgment is not due to some 
separate faculty of moral insightlO but is the result of 
bringing our past experience to bear on the immediate 
situation using our ability to reason. In this way we can 
form general ideas or principles to "bring ... to deliberation 
on particular situations.llusing the material of experience 
to discover principles is called inductive reasoning. The 
8 Toulmin, p. 102. 
9 Toulmin, p. 136. 
10 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 266. 
11 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 276. 
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theory of induction holds that there is an intellectual 
process whereby we move from knowledge of particulars to 
knowledge of universals. On one theory we perceive essen-
ces12 and engage in collective generalization (adding 
instances) leading to intellectual principles being grasped 
through insight or formed by applying some general principle 
of intelligibility to particular instances. Because the 
specific and intelligible necessity of connection may not be 
apparent, some hold experimental generalization or inductive 
argument just probable, unlike syllogistic deductive 
argument where a conclusion follows of necessity. 
Although perfect induction would involve canvassing 
all instances, experimental generalizations may arise out of 
connections that are not always reproducible or even 
demonstrable, but theoretical repetition may at least 
indicate probability. Dewey maintains that the problem is 
often one of finding representative cases and, for him, in 
fact, one representative instance may be sufficient to 
continue inquiry.13 
The most important issue for Dewey is to avoid any 
inductive/deductive dualism, which, he claims, was a later 
historical development when classic syllogistic logic was 
12 See a further reference to this in the conclusion of 
this chapter. 
13 Dewey, Logic, (LW: 12] p. 432. 
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found inadequate for the new scientific inquiry. The logic 
of deduction, then: 
... was supplemented by superimposition of an 
inductive logic supposed to formulate the methods 
employed in physical investigations. In consequence, 
both the so-called deductive and inductive logics 
suffered in their own contents.14 
In effect~ both inductive and deductive logic are for Dewey 
just one tools of inquiry, and neither constitute the sole 
method by which inquiry may be undertaken any more than 
inductive logic is the sole means by which contemporary 
scientific investigation is undertaken. Although inquiry has 
"in our own culture taken on the character of an institu-
tion," particularly in the activities of scientists, it is, 
in fact, a way of behaving when we encounter a problematic 
situation.15 Types of inquiry develop within a matrix of a 
particular culture as part of our "common sense" day-to-day 
activities. While developing a theory of logic may not be a 
common activity of most persons in most cultures, a few, 
such as Aristotle, if not Dewey, have attempted it. Logical 
forms are, after all, the product of human thought, "con-
structed during the process of inquiry as means of carrying 
out an inquiry. 11 16 
14 Ibid., p. 479. 
15 Kennedy, "Dewey's Logic ... ," Guide to the Works of 
John Dewey, pp. 70-71. 
16 Ibid. 
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Dewey further maintains that a distinction between 
induction and deduction is irrelevant to the processes of 
inquiry. 
Sagacity in evaluation, scrupulous care in notation 
and record, cherishing and development of suggestion, 
a keen eye for relevant analogies, tentative 
experimentation, physical and imaginative shaping of 
material so that it takes the form of a diagrammatic 
representation, are all demanded whether the subject-
matter in question is inductive or deductive ••• the 
objective is determination of effective existential 
data or relevant and effective conceptions.17 
Here Dewey is expressing what Toulmin concludes when he says 
we "have occasion in practice to classify some arguments as 
substantial and conclusive, or as both analytic and tenta-
tive.1118 After all, Dewey is not really offering a theory of 
logic (in spite of the title of the work), but rather a 
theory of inquiry. What is more, inquiry for Dewey is at all 
times ultimately existential, even though formal methods of 
logic may be used in the process, and Toulmin's statement of 
the classification of arguments 1§ practical, and, further, 
it is certainly existential in our common sense understand-
ing of everyday life. This tentative view about the present 
state of things can be subject to further verification in 
the process of inquiry that in turn leads to making a 
warranted assertion about the matter. For Dewey such an 
assertion represents a conclusive argument with regard to 
the solution of the immediate problem situation. 
17 Dewey, Logic, [LW: 12] p. 478. 
18 Toulmin, p. 137. 
22 
0ewey's Warranted Assertibility. 
In this dissertation certain claims are made about 
the congruence of Dewey's and Aristotle's ethical theory. 
The process of making judgments involves, as Dewey says: 
... estimation, appraisal, assigning value to 
something: a discrimination as to advantage: 
serviceability, fitness for a purpose, enjoyability, 
and so on.19 
That is, using what Dewey calls the process of inquiry, a 
judgement about a claim must somehow take into consideration 
all those things that we possibly can determine to be true 
about the matter. 
The truth of a claim that is asserted as a result of 
Dewey's process of inquiry has what he calls "warranted 
assertibility. 11 This is more than simply stating something 
to be the case, a formulated proposition that this or that 
is how we are aware that this or that is so. A perspectival 
view is adequate as far as it goes but offers us no way to 
determine the truth of a proposition, if our awareness 
cannot sufficiently determine how things actually are. 
How then can we define "truth"? Dewey uses Charles 
Sanders Peirce's coherence definition rather weakly at one 
point,20 but then, unfortunately, never provides a simple 
19 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 264. 
20 Dewey, Logic, [LW: 12] p. 343. "The opinion which is 
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is 
what we mean by truth ... " Charles Santiago Sanders Peirce, 
Pragmatism and Pragmaticism. Vol. V. Collected Papers. ed. 
by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1931-1958), p. 268. 
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definition of "warranted assertion." What he does propose is 
a whole theory, a loqic intended to warrant knowledge.21 
That is, by his method of inquiry, which was discussed 
earli~~ in this chapter, knowledge results from "the 
directed or controlled transformation of an indeterminate 
situation into a determinately unified one. 11 22 But is such 
"knowledge" merely propositional in that the application of 
a method results in the resolution of some situation merely 
to the satisfaction of the applier? One can object to such 
an experiential approach on the grounds that it is still 
perspectival to the user, and while it may give knowledge 
that relates the individual to the truth or falsity of a 
particular proposition, it tells nothing about whether 
something actually is the case. Any knowledge gained is only 
that of the experiencer. 
However, it is essential to Dewey's thought that 
knowledge must always be considered in view of the process 
of reaching that knowledge. A result called "knowledge" may 
be "true" or "false" in a propositional sense, but if it 
does not further the process of inquiry, such knowledge 
·cannot be said to have warranted assertibility. In a sense, 
21 There are a few paragraphs (Logic, [LW: 12] pp. 7-8) 
where Dewey expresses a preference for the words "warranted 
assertibility" to "knowledge" or "belief" to express the 
state of affairs in which doubt is removed as a result of 
inquiry, but the passage goes on to suggest and then deny 
that "truth" and "knowledge" are synonymous. This material 
is not particularly useful or relevant to my purpose. 
22 Dewey, Logic, [LW: 12] p. 121. 
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this is the "how" of our awareness that this or that is so: 
we have applied the theory. 
Further, the operation must also include temporal and 
physical qualities that are modified and rearranged in the 
process of inquiry. Thus, the final product is a "truth-
bearer" in the sense that it is a statement or object 
reached as the result of applying the method of inquiry in 
the fullest sense of a dynamic process of "transformation." 
What all this may mean requires that we must continue 
to plunge forward, as Dewey develops terminology as he goes 
along, and accept intuitively that his statements will be 
gradually transformed into a unified whole. One might almost 
say that one cannot just read and reflect on Dewey, but that 
one must also "experience" him. Clearly, for Dewey the 
entire process leading to warranted assertibility is both 
operational and experiential. 
Yet considering how to "experience" Dewey brings us 
back to the question of how warranted assertibility is an 
statement of how things are. If by experience we mean 
immediate sensory stimulation, the account would be inade-
quate. However, if knowledge can only result from cognitive 
rational activity, even accompanied by James' "cephalic 
movement," we are no closer to a complete account. Added to 
which the entire corpus of Dewey's work revolves in no small 
part around his use of the term "experience." 
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It is not unusual to find a philosophical concept 
broken down into its components with only one of these parts 
dealt with, while the rest get dumped in a box labelled 
"later" or "don't fit." It is particularly tempting to deal 
only with John Dewey's clearer statements because his dense 
language sometimes renders a familiar philosophical compo-
nent quite unrecognizable, or he jumbles together a boxful 
of bits with a label that is not part of our philosophical 
vocabulary. An example of this is Dewey's use of the term 
"environment," by which he means not only "a field in which 
observation of this or that object or event occurs," but 
also "the universe of experience."23 This definition of 
"environment" obviously is not a direct answer to the 
question, "What is experience?" It is, however Dewey's all-
encompassing answer to "how things are;" that is, environ-
ment includes, and at the same time, IS, all the constitu-
ents of an experienced situation. 
Now, consistent with his abhorrence of any sort of 
dualism, Dewey dismisses the either/or of realism and 
idealism with an appeal to a "unity of relationship" between 
cognitive and empirical experience. This includes logical 
relations of both abstract terms and propositions, which 
must "be satisfied in the course of inquiry [in order to 
formulate] the ultimate goal of inquiry in complete satis-
faction of logical conditions. 11 24 That is, some logical 
23 Ibid., p. 530. 
24 Ibid., p. 346. 
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principles are essential to the unity of relationship that 
establishes the environment for both the operation of 
inquiry and the goal or end-in-view of the operation. 
Inquiry, then is the working relationship between facts and 
ideas. This functional attribute is an operational process, 
however, not a fixed static point. It is the state of growth 
from antecedent reality to consequent reality, which are 
really only abstractions marking off a segment of the 
dynamic process of transformation.25 
The process -- and the goal -- of Dewey's operation 
of inquiry is "the state" of how things are. Since it is the 
operation of inquiry, that is, the process of establishing a 
unity of relationship, that is the warranted assertion that 
such is indeed the case, warranted assertibility is another 
way of stating "how things are." 
Achinstein's concepts of evidence and probability 
While the process of inquiry assures the procedural 
means to examine the works of Dewey and of Aristotle, it is 
necessary at this point to discuss the way in which the 
presentation of data and warrants for such data constitute 
evidence and as such are confirmation of the claim presented 
in each chapter; that is, assure that the material means are 
25 Gertrude Ezorsky, "Dewey: truth as warranted 
assertibility" from article on Pragmatic Theory of Truth, 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, v. 6 (New York: Macmillan, 
1967), pp. 428-430. 
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adequate. While the nature of this work is not such that 
evidence can be defined solely in the propositional form of 
deductive logic, for example, even if such a process were 
acceptable to Dewey's pattern of inquiry, the "aim is to 
provide conditions that determine when a body of information 
is evidence that some hypothesis or theory is true. 11 26 These 
conditions are met in part by the use of Dewey's method that 
assures ~arranted assertibility. This would show that there 
is a unity of relationship in the comparison of Dewey and 
Aristotle that leads to a warranted assertion that it is 
indeed the case that Dewey's 1932 Ethics are Aristotelian. 
Even if such a conclusion cannot be asserted, the method 
should ensure at least that the claims are "theoretically 
and practically informative. 11 27 
Determining the probability of the correspondence of 
concepts is already difficult in terms of comparison of the 
language of Dewey and of Aristotle. Further, Peter Achin-
stein maintains that to say that data or a warrant is 
evidence that.an hypothesis is true does not mean that there 
is an increase in probability of the truth of that hypothe-
sis. Although he does not "claim that probability is 
irrelevant for evidence, 11 28 Achinstein holds that standard 
26 Peter Achinstein, Concepts of Evidence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 2. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Achinstein, Concepts, p. 157. 
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definitions of probability are inadequate and proposes what 
he calla an "explanation definition." 
According to this explanation definition, data or 
warrants serve as potential evidence that an hypothesis is 
true if and only if that evidence is true and the hypothesis 
could correctly explain the evidence if the hypothesis were 
true. Although Achinstein says that he does not really find 
this an adequate definition, he provides nothing further 
himself. However, Achinstein's explanation definition 
actually does satisfy Dewey's condition for warranted 
assertibility. That is, an environment is set up in which 
the "problem" is in effect intrinsic to the solution, and 
both are encompassed by those ideas and facts of "how things 
are" in the pattern of inquiry. 
Conclusion 
By clarifying Dewey's pattern of inquiry with a 
method by which to make claims about the hypothesis of this 
dissertation, the task has been broken down into what Dewey 
called "constituent distinctions and relations.n29 The 
"primary and secondary material will be built up into 
warrants to support the claims of each chapter. While it may 
not be possible to subject these judgments to the rigors of 
pro~ability analysis, any conclusions will at least meet the 
conditions of Dewey's warranted assertibility. 
29 Dewey, Logic, p. 108. 
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Dewey emphasizes that "in both science and common 
sense, the operations of transformation, reconstruction, 
control, and union of theory and practice in experimental 
activity ... are analogous to those involved in moral acti-
vity."30 Now the dynamic process of growth is related to 
persons, who, after all, are the agents of moral activity. 
While it may not be possible to establish more than a 
minimal correspondence between Aristotle and some of Dewey's 
points and processes contained in the 1932 Ethics, it is in 
the arena of moral activity that this inquiry will take 
place. Any conclusions reached will be rather more of the 
nature of similar structures of the ethics of Dewey and 
Aristotle than of final absolute principles. 
"Absolute principles" appear so attractive today 
partly because of the continuing power of that "quest 
for certainty" about which John Dewey wrote. Not that 
it needed Dewey to teach us the weakness of ab-
solutism: Aristotle himself saw that ethics contained 
no essences and that there is accordingly no basis 
for geometrically rigorous theories in ethics.3 1 
Here is actually an instance of a case that could be made 
for Dewey's Aristotelianism with regard to the topics of 
absolutism and essences. Although a discussion of the 
Aristotelian content of another of John Dewey's great 
30 Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoin-
der," in Paul Arthur Schilpp, The Philosophy of John Dewey 
The Library of Living Philosophers Vol. I (Evanston and 
Chicago: Northwestern University Press), pp. 579-80. 
31 Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of 
Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 341. 
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works32 is beyond the scope of the present task, the above 
quote from Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin is also an 
example of material means found in secondary literature from 
which one can infer the similar positions of Dewey and 
Aristotle. Their positions on systems of ethical theory have 
already been discussed briefly in a way that leads to the 
implication that, in this matter at least, Dewey may be 
Aristotelian. 
In the following chapter, I will undertake the proce-
dural means of examining secondary literature to determine, 
first, what it is to be Aristotelian; second, what others 
say about Dewey in this regard; and, finally, what Dewey 
says himself about his philosophical heritage. The subse-
quent chapters will set out in what specific ways some 
concepts Dewey presents in the 1932 Ethics are Aristotelian. 
The structure and process of the method presented in this 
chapter will be used to compare what Dewey says and what 
Aristotle says -- and what each appear to mean by what they 
say -- to determine the extent, if any, to which it can be 
claimed that Dewey's 1932 Ethics is Aristotelian. 
By presenting primary source evidence of the words of 
both Aristotle and Dewey and drawing on support from 
secondary sources, the points of each ethical structure will 
be indicated, as will the processes that connect these 
32 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, (New York: Minton, 
Ba 1 ch , 19 2 9 ) [ LW : 4 ] . 
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points. If it appears that the method of inquiry and what is 
being accomplished by this method are one and the same 
thing, that is indeed the case. 
The particular elements of the ethics of John Dewey 
that have been chosen for this dissertation as points in a 
structure of Dewey's ethics are conduct and character, 
virtue and reflective morality, and the teleology of human 
acts. The functional or operative process of these in terms 
of both the individual and society will connect the points 
of the structure. What I perceive as comparable points and 
functions in Aristotle also constitute a structure, which 
itself can be compared to the structure of similar points 
and functions in Dewey's ethics. 
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CHAPTER III 
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE "ARISTOTELIAN''? 
There are several strands to Aristotle's work that 
can be said to characterize his philosophy. Randall 
summarizes these as a "formalistic naturalism" or a 
"structuralistic functionalism. 11 1 
Aristotle's naturalism 
One view of naturalism takes direct experience of the 
world as its primary subject matter.2 Although there were 
"naturalist" philosophers before Aristotle, they tended to 
devise speculative hypotheses and theories that had little 
acquaintance with empirical facts.3 Aristotle sought to 
reconcile observation of nature with the practice of 
dialectic, the systematic discussion of beliefs and facts 
that Plato regards as the primary method of philosophical 
inquiry.4 Although dialectic takes the form of question-and-
answer between different persons in Plato, in Aristotle's 
1 Randall, Aristotle, p. 295. 
2 Ibid., p. 297. 
3 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 119. 
4 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 7. 
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works dialectical conversation becomes one person taking 
both parts in the development of philosophical exploration.5 
Aristotle's formalism 
There is a certain formalism to the method of dia-
lectic. John Dewey and others have attributed a too rigid 
formalism to some of Aristotle's thought, particularly to 
the application of that logic which has come down through 
the scholastic tradition. However, one cannot escape the 
fact that there is a formal procedure to be followed in 
factorial analysis, that is, the search for factors and 
structure within subject matter in order to understand these 
in terms of their functioning within the context of the 
subject matter.6 For example, biological taxonomy, the 
method of classification, requires a formal series of steps 
to final identification. Logical realism views knowledge as 
a discovery of what is experienced to be there and not 
merely a human invention. 
Further, "what is there" exhibits the characteristics 
of Aristotle's functional realism, the view that "structures 
·found are always those of determinate processes, functioning 
in determinate contexts. 117 This is the functionalism that 
includes observable structures that have a describable and 
5 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 488. 
6 Randall, Aristotle, p. 297. 
7 Ibid., pp. 299-300. 
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often predictable "formal" way of behaving according to 
their nature. 
It must be remembered that Aristotle's logical and 
functional realisms are two aspects of his theory that 
universals exist only in the experienced world. This theory 
is opposed to the Platonic idealistic theory of an unchang-
ing and eternal world of ideal and perfect forms. On Plato's 
account, reason recognizes contrasts and similarities 
between the experienced world and the Realm of Ideas, and 
thus identifies things. A person thereby recovers knowledge 
that was forgotten when psyche became enmeshed in matter. 
Aristotle's universals can be grasped by human reason 
and are not dependent on Plato's Realm of Ideas. That is, 
they exist independently of the mind but not independently 
of the things in which they are recognized. First order 
universals are apprehended a prioria and include mathemati-
cal concepts and logical constructs that, while not "exper-
ienced," nonetheless can be grasped by reason and used to 
discover knowledge of the things perceived or experienced. 
Aristotelian second order universals also exist indepen-
dently of the mind but can be recognized in particulars, 
such as two plus two equals four. In this case one can say 
that universals "are to be induced by experience. 119 The use 
8 Takatura Ando, Aristotle's Theory of Practical 
Cognition (The Hague: Marcus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 189. 
9 Ibid. 
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of these tools of reason in the experienced world guarantee 
a formal or structured approach to knowledge by means that 
are consistent with the processes or "functional" aspect of 
Aristotle's natural world. 
Aristotle's structuralistic functionalism 
Direct experience of the world is the primary subject 
matter for Aristotle. Thus, naturalism relies on experience 
and rational .methods of inquiry to discover the structure of 
an organic relationship or way in which human beings 
function in themselves and with their environment. A way of 
looking at this has been summarized by Chambliss as: 
... the ways in which human beings take action as part 
of their nature. [This view of naturalism) is a 
declaration of the idea that we cannot avoid making 
our own social and political nature. Since to be 
social is to be human, we make our own human nature. 
Aristotle's naturalism stands out in the idea that 
things of nature have ends .•. 10 
Thus nature is a teleological system in which natural 
objects, including human beings, function and interrelate as 
part of an overall pattern or order that is natural both to 
the individual objects and to the universe itself. For 
Aristotle, the structure of nature can be grasped through 
formal methods of reasoning, as well as through experience. 
To do so is not to put reason in opposition to experience, 
but rather each is contained within the other as the 
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10 J.J. Chambliss, Educational Theory as the Theory of 
Conduct: From Aristotle to Dewey (Albany: State University 
of New York Press), 1987. p. 23. 
experience of reasoning about nature gives meaning or reason 
to the experience Q.f. nature. 
The structure or system of the natural order for 
human beings includes psychological and social as well as 
biological factors, all of which function or operate in 
relationship to one another so as to enable specific tasks 
or activities to be accomplished. It is in this sense that 
Aristotelianism can be said to be a "structuralistic 
functionalism." The Aristotelian naturalist directly 
experiences the world within the context of a biological, 
psychological, and social structure, which can be known both 
perceptually and through the use of reason. It is in this 
sense that an Aristotelian can be said to be a formalistic 
naturalist. 
John Dewey and Greek philosophy 
In order to answer the question of whether Dewey was 
an Aristotelian, we cannot depend on what he said of 
himself. Probably no philosopher has ever attributed to her 
own position the wholehearted adoption and assimilation of 
all of the characteristics of the philosophy developed by 
another. As case in point, we have Aristotle who, while 
accepting Plato's view that there are universals, nonethe-
less argued in favor of the universal inhering in a natural 
order, against Plato's view of the universal as eternal 
forms residing in the Realm of Ideas. So, while Platonic 
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concepts can be traced in Aristotle's thought, we could not 
say that Aristotle was a proponent of this aspect of Plato's 
philosophical thought. 
Dewey, in fact, often says how drawn he is to Plato's 
writing, but approval of Plato's dialogues on the teaching 
of morality, for instance,11 by no means makes Dewey's total 
view of moral theory Platonic, except perhaps in the same 
sense as it can be said that Aristotle was Platonic because 
he agreed with Plato's belief in universals but disagreed 
with the Theory of Forms.12 
However, Dewey was greatly influenced by the ideas of 
the Greek philosophers, and to determine the extent of this 
influence we need to draw not only on what Dewey said of 
himself, but also on what other persons said about him. By 
way of a preliminary example, which also suggests Dewey's 
position with regard to Plato's Realm of Ideas, Lewis Hahn 
says that Dewey's is a pragmatic naturalism in which "not 
eternal static realities or permanent substances but 
qualitied events, things in time, temporal processes, 
histories, or historical events, happenings are centra1. 11 13 
Now, this example does not bring us very much closer to 
determining if Dewey is Aristotelian, but one can suggest 
11 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 163. 
12 Irwin, Classical Thought, pp. 123-124. 
13 Lewis E. Hahn, "Dewey's Philosophy and Philosophic 
Method," in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 40. 
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that it may be enough to indicate that, like Aristotle, 
Dewey did not agree with Plato's view of the universal. 
What do others say of Dewey's relationship with Greek 
philosophy? There is an enormous amount of evidence to 
examine, and everyone seems to quote everyone else. I would 
like to begin with what was said of Dewey after his death. 
In 1958, an informal meeting of ten men who had known and 
worked with John Dewey, in some cases for forty years, was 
tape-recorded. Their conversation was transcribed, edited, 
and published in 1959 to mark the centennial of Dewey's 
birth. At the end of the evening, one of the men at the 
meeting read a letter that he had presented to Dewey on his 
90th birthday in 1950. Alvin Johnson was a classical Greek 
scholar and political scientist, who, with John Dewey and 
other educators, founded the New School for Social Research 
in 1919 and retired as president emeritus in 1945. He wrote: 
To John Dewey, latest of all the great Greek philoso-
phers. But have you not been fighting the Greek 
philosophers? So you have: Greek philosopher has 
fought Greek philosopher since before Thales and 
Heracleitus the obscure. But in one thing you, John 
Qewey, and the Greeks are one. You have all fought 
fe~;i •••• the blacker night of the mind, where habits, 
traditions, abstractions, assumptions, prejudices, 
hatreds at large, dance ... 14 
Most sources seem to agree that Dewey drew on his 
earlier experience of Greek philosophy less after he became 
acquainted with F.J.E. Woodbridge, Johnson, and others who 
14 Lamont, ed., Dialogue on John Dewey, p. 139. 
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wore their classical scholarship lightly as they went about 
more immediate matters in the world around them. While Dewey 
did maintain in the 1908 Ethics some knee-jerk biases 
against the classical tradition, these were minor compared 
to the polemic enjoined against the later classical modern 
tradition in the persons of Kant and Bentham.15 In the 1932 
Ethics, Dewey makes frequent reference to Aristotle, 
although he does not directly quote from the Nicomachean 
Ethics or other works. The number of references to Aristo-
tle's Ethics has also increased in the Literature at the end 
of chapters in the 1932 edition.16 
John Anton, in particular, points out that Dewey had 
a genuine affinity to Aristotle, which his "students saw 
more clearly than Dewey ever realized, or perhaps was 
willing to admit. 11 17 John Herman Randall, who was one of 
Dewey's students and later his colleague at Columbia 
University, has probably proposed the most relevant 
connections between Aristotle and Dewey. From this con-
nection that others saw, although is was never acknowledged 
directly by Dewey, it could reasonably be inferred that 
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15 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, see Ch. 13 and 14, pp. 235-284. 
16 From only three books mentioned in the 1908 Ethics, 
Dewey has increased the Literature references in the 1932 
Ethics to include Aristotle's entire Nicomachean Ethics. 
17 John P. Anton, "John Dewey and Ancient Philoso-
phies," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (1965}, 
p. 485. 
Dewey continued to study Aristotle over the long years of 
ongoing intellectual growth and development. 
Dewey and Hegel 
Occasionally, it is suggested that Dewey is in some 
way a "Hegelian," in part through the influence of one of 
his early mentors at Johns Hopkins, George Sylvester Morris, 
who maintained that Hegel and Aristotle were in essential 
agreement.18 ·Harris had studied in Germany under Friedrich 
A. Trendelenburg who had concluded that "the organic 
operation of the natural world argues to the existence of a 
guiding intelligence. 11 19 Morris then came under the influ-
ence of the British neo-Hegelian, Thomas H. Green, who, 
Dewey says, argues "that the only conceivable world •... is a 
single, permanent, and all-inclusive system of relations, 11 20 
that is bonded by "a permanent, single consciousness. 11 21 It 
must be noted that Morris had rejected Trendelenburg's 
Aristotelian naturalism, yet it seems that that was the very 
thing Dewey was later to develop in his own philosophy. In 
the same way, Dewey picked up on Green's "system of rela-
tions," but gives no more hint of any religious or other 
18 Ibid. 
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19 Neil Coughlan, Young John Dewey (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 22. 
20 Dewey, [EW: 3], p. 20. 
21 Ibid., p. 22. 
conviction of supernatural guidance or control of the 
natural world than Aristotle does. 
Hahn, however, makes the point that although Dewey 
acknowledged his debt to Hegel, Dewey also believed that his 
critics had exaggerated his indebtedness, as Hahn says: 
•.. because they had not paid due regard to the 
context or situation in which he used certain terms, 
and that, in any event, objective idealism does not 
have a monopoly on the interpretation of such words 
as 'whole, complete, coherence, integration,' and 
presumably 'interrelated unity' or 'interdepen-
dence'. 22 
Dewey himself says: 
There was a period extending into my earlier years at 
Chicago when, in connection with a seminar on Hegel's 
Logic I tried reinterpreting his categories in terms 
of "readjustment" and "reconstruction." Gradually I 
came to realize that what the principles actually 
stood for could be better understood and stated when 
completely emancipated from Hegelian garb.23 
During the early years of World War I, Dewey's 
attitude toward Hegel in particular changed even more as he 
attributed to German philosophy the rise of Prussian 
militarism.24 "It is customary to call (Hegel] an Idealist. 
In one sense .•. he is the greatest realist known to philo-
sophy. He might be called a Brutalist. 11 25 At this time, too, 
22 Hahn, "Dewey's Philosophy and Philosophic Method," 
in Guide to the Works, pp. 24-25. 
23 Jane M. Dewey, ed., "Biography of John Dewey," 
Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 17-18. 
24 Max H. Fisch, "Dewey's Critical and Historical 
Studies," in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 320. 
25 Dewey, German Philosoohv and Politics (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1915), p. 107; [MW: 8] p. 191. 
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Dewey changed his attitude on American non-involvement and 
began to support American entry in the European war. 
In the 1908 Ethics, Dewey makes three references to 
Hegel by way of example of a type of moral theory in which 
"both the good and the law of the individual are placed on a 
strictly institutional basis."26 However, his discussion of 
the nature of moral theory in the 1932 Ethics does not 
contain these quotations, neither is there further any 
reference to Hegel in the body of this text.27 One must 
conclude that, by 1932, Dewey really had no further need of 
or use for Hegel. 
Dewey's naturalism 
Dewey's naturalism, like Aristotle's, involves direct 
experience of the world. However, our human nature is also 
experienced as we are engaged in interrelationships that 
involve much more than just our human experience of the 
world. In effect this view of the nature of human relation-
ships suggests that our sum of human experiences contributes 
as a part of the sum of all experiences of humanity, that in 
c . . 
--· ' ;< 
26 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 208. 
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27 There are two end of chapter Literature references 
at p. 157, Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel, 1893, and p. 81, 
Hegel, Philosophy of History, 1881, the latter also appears 
in Checklist of References, p. 502, along with Hegel, 
Philosophy of Right, 1896, but I can't find reference to 
this last anywhere in the text. 
turn can be recognized as part of our individual experience. 
But we must be aware that: 
••. experience is Qt as well as in nature. It is not 
experience which is experienced, but nature ... Things 
interacting in certain ways ~ experience: they are 
what is experienced.28 
This is a naturalism that involves the individual in 
interaction with the natural and the social world, for on 
Dewey's account these cannot be separated. Nor is the 
involvement of the individual with the world separate from 
that which it is the nature of the human person to be. 
Dewey's 1932 view of the individual as being by 
nature involved in the total environment represents a change 
in his thinking. His earlier position that the individual 
merely affected and was affected by the environment drew on 
limited psychological ethics in "terms of inner-individual 
processes ... Now, however ... there is a direct focus on the 
full complexity of natural and social relations ... 11 29 
Dewey's formalism 
Direct experience of the world includes a temporal 
.development that leads to knowledge. By undertaking any 
inquiry a person is engaged in that sorting and ordering of 
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28 Dewey, Experience and Nature rev.ed. (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1929), p. 4a: [LW: 1] p. 12. 
29 Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flower, Introduction, 
1932 Ethics, p. xxvi. 
the material means of experience that utilize the formal 
procedural means of the process of inquiry . 
••. knowledge implies judgement (and hence thinking) 
... [and] such terms as 'thinking,' ·reflection,' and 
'judgement' denote inquiries or the results of 
inquiry, and [further] inquiry occupies an inter-
mediate and mediating place in the development of an 
experience.30 
We saw that Dewey's pattern of inquiry does have a formal, 
procedural process of treating the material means, the 
subject matter of experience. Through scientific inquiry, we 
discover and come to understand "the distinctive features of 
nature and how experience is one type of natural trans-
action. 1131 
Dewey's structuralistic functionalism 
Once again, it is another of Dewey's innumerable 
definitions of "experience" as "the interaction of organism 
and environment, resulting in some adaptation which secures 
utilization of the latter, 11 32 that describes the func~ional 
aspect of his thought. His naturalism thus involves dynamic 
30 Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1916), p. 1; [MW: 10] p. 320. 
31 Richard J. Bernstein, John Dewey (New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 79. 
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32 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry 
Holt, 1920), p. 87; [MW: 12] p. 129. 
functions of "interactions or trans actions of varying 
durations and extents"33 
There is a diverse structure to these functions on 
three levels. Hahn commenting on Dewey describes these as: 
1) the physico-chemical level of mass-energy interac-
tions, the level on which the physical sciences seek 
to discover the properties and relations of things in 
terms of which they may serve as means or instrumen-
talities, 2) the psychophysical or organic pattern of 
need-demand-satisfaction activities, and 3) the level 
of mind or human experience in which social transac-
tions and meaning come in. Matter, life, and mind 
accordingly are not separate and distinct kinds of 
Being but rather different modes of interconnection 
and operation •.. 34 
Development of Dewey's thought 
Dewey has not been helpful to us who try to deal with 
his philosophy. Not only is his writing dense, but it is 
also particularly difficult to read, as Dewey attempts to 
construct a vocabulary to express his thought. This vocabu-
lary was in lifelong process of change and refinement, but 
Dewey rarely drew attention to the instances where he was 
using earlier concepts as part of newer concepts expressed 
with different terms. Thus the "reflex arc" as a concept of 
the response of reason to the data of experience lost its 
simple connotation of behavioralist cause and effect and 
became subsumed into "rational morality" in the 1932 Ethics, 
and, without much clarification, into the "matrix of 
33 Hahn, "Dewey's Philosophy and Philosophic Method," 
Guide.to the Works, p. 42. 
34 Ib'd 42 3 1 • ' pp. -4 • 
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inquiry" in the I,,oqic, which now included not only psycho-
logical thought responses to stimulii, but also biological 
and social elements, all operating in relation to one 
another. But Dewey never alludes to this development of his 
thought, much less spells out the incorporation of his 
earlier concept into a larger whole. 
Dewey was well aware, however, that his need to 
express his philosophy in what he hoped was common, 
understandable language was problematic. He even considered 
changing the title of Experience and Nature to culture and 
Nature in a revised edition because of his: 
•.. growing realization that the historical obstacles 
which prevented understanding of my use of "ex-
perience" are~ for all practical purposes, insur-
mountable •.. 3 
Even when he seemed to be making a clear statement, Dewey's 
words are open to misinterpretation. For instance, one of 
the few reviews of the 1932 Ethics places Dewey in the ranks 
of universalistic or consequentialist utilitarianism.36 
While it is true that Dewey has a great deal to say about 
utilitarianism, the reviewer failed to notice that such 
attention was for the purpose of setting up Dewey's 
rejection of either a utilitarian or deontological basis for 
' 
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35 Dewey, quoted in Textual Commentary, Experience and 
Nature, (LW: 1] p. 361. 
36 Frank Chapman Sharp, book review in International 
Journal of Ethics 44 (1933-34), p. 159. 
a complete •oral theory in favor of one that provides 
"principles which are truly relevant in our own day."37 
conclusion 
Dewey's article, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A 
Rejoinder," concludes with a general remark to his critics, 
with a reference to Dr. Randall, that he considers some 
criticisms to be "negotiable differences, matters of degree 
rather than of central principles. 11 38 While it is not clear 
to which of Randall's specific criticisms Dewey is referr-
ing, much of this article is an attempt to clarify some 
misconceptions arising from his "admitted lack of clearness 
in [his] previous writing. 11 39 The general tenor of Randall's 
remarks had been to accuse Dewey of being some sort of 
crypto-neothomist, while at the same time entreating him to 
unveil himself as "he who of all thinkers can today best 
claim to be the representative of Aristotelian thought ... 11 40 
We have seen and will see again that Randall has an 
extravagant view of John Dewey as heir to, if not reincar-
nation of, Aristotle. Be that as it may, Randall provides us 
37 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 283. 
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38 Dewey, in Schlipp, ed. The Philosophy of John Dewey, 
p. 606. 
39 Ibid. 
40 John Herman Randall, "Dewey's Interpretation of the 
History of Philosophy," in Schlipp, ed., The Philosophy of 
John Dewey, p. 102. 
with an_ argument for the commonality of ideas between Dewey 
and Aristotle can begin; for he says that: 
... Dewey himself seems to be working primarily with 
the conceptions of Aristotle. In his naturalism, his 
plur-alism, his logical and social empiricism, his 
realism, his natural teleology ... above all, in his 
thoroughgoing functionalism, his Aristotelian 
translation of all the problems of matter and form 
into a functional context--to say nothing of his 
basic social and ethical concepts--in countless vital 
matters he is nearer to the Stagirite than to any 
other philosopher.41 
Part of our task is to see the extent to which Randall may 
be correct in his evaluation. The factor of naturalism as a 
functional structuralism that can be examined by formal 
means has been established as characteristic of Aris-
totelianism, and also is characteristic of John Dewey's 
philosophy in a way that Platonism and Hegelianism are not. 
It remains to examine more specific aspects of both Dewey's 
and Aristotle's ethics. 
An additional point is the teleology or end of the 
ethics of either Dewey or Aristotle. The aspects covered in 
the next three chapters -- conduct and character, virtue, 
and the social role of the human person, are in fact, ends-
in-view in Dewey's terms. They also are parts of the 
structures of each philosopher's ethics revealed in these 
chapters. It is these structures that may give us an 
indication of some ultimate end or telos that will be 
discussed in the final chapter. 
41 Ibid., p. 101. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ETHICS AS CONDUCT OR CHARACTER 
While the way in which persons behave is of concern 
to society, the sort of person that behaves in a particular 
way seems to be of less concern. That is, as long as we 
conduct ourselves in a way consistent with what society 
expects of us, the sort of character we have seems to be of 
lesser importance. However, for both Dewey and Aristotle it 
is the character of the person that informs his conduct. 
Further, it is through learning appropriate conduct 
that a person's character is formed. Habit plays a role in 
this development of character. So does a reasoned under-
standing of why one sort of conduct is more appropriate than 
another. As Aristotle says, "actions should express correct 
reason. 111 Therefore, character is as important as conquct. 
Neither Dewey nor Aristotle provides us with a system 
of how one ought to behave, much less a set of rules to 
guide such behavior. Yet both of them base their ethics on 
what can be observed to be experienced and what experiences 
guide and motivate conduct. For both philosophers, the roles 
of habit and of practice are fundamental to conduct, while, 
1 Aristotle, HE, 1103b33. 
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as we shall see, the type of conduct in which an individual 
engages seems to be a factor of the character of that 
individual. Further, it is clear that the development of 
certain conduct begins in the very young and is part of the 
experience of education, both in the family and in the 
schools. This chapter examines the relationship of character 
and conduct as points in the structure of ethics and begins 
with an example of the process by which these elements are 
developed in one elementary school.2 The reason for using 
this anecdotal material is because it shows the process 
through which character development takes place, first by 
following rules imposed with an intention to habituate and 
then by adopting rules that arise from consideration of the 
best possible conduct. 
The new principal made it very clear that she 
intended to be as much involved with the children and with 
the teachers as with the running of the school. One small 
interdiction was on teachers' taking coffee to their 
classrooms. "It is not safe to carry hot beverages in the 
corridors where children are present," she said. on the 
first rainy schoolday, while attempting to drive their 
offspring to the school door across the playground where 
busses were offloading and many children were on foot, 
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2 Shirley Buchanan of Sauk Elementary School, where the 
principal is Lynn Badgley, Ph.D., Richton Park, Matteson, 
Illinois, provided the anecdotal material in this chapter 
during several delightful telephone conversations. 
parents were surprised to meet the new principal setting up 
a barrier, "It is not safe to have cars in the playground 
when the children are arriving," she said. As each class 
arrived at the lunchroom on the first day, the principal 
addressed them. "There are nine rules in the lunchroom. You 
will learn three each day.• She proceeded to tell the 
children the first three, had the class repeat them, and 
asked, "How many lunchroom rules are there altogether'?" 
"Nine!" came the chorus of little voices. On the second day, 
she lined the children up and taught them the next three 
rules. On the third day, the principal had each class file 
to their places in the lunchroom and sit down before she had 
them repeat the first six rules. Then she gave them the last 
three, "Don't trade food, don't go to another table to chat, 
chew with your mouth closed." 
In the first two instances, the principal was setting 
up some standards of behavior for teachers and parents based 
on an appeal to the general principle of concern for the 
safety of children at school. In the third instance, she was 
setting up standards of acceptable behavior for the children 
in the lunchroom, but did not appeal to any general princi-
ple. The children were being taught rules of conduct. The 
adults, too, were in effect being given "rules," but their 
conduct would be based upon their reasoned acceptance of the 
rule as an appropriate way to ensure the safety of the 
children. 
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Dewey says that the initial motivation of any conduct 
is interest.3 The involvement of the principal in the day-
to-day activity aroused the interest of all parties. She 
also knew what Dewey said was " ••• the difficulty of main-
taining an idea, in keeping attention alert and contin-
uous. 114 With the children, repetition leading to "habitu-
ation" of the children in rule-following was appropriate, 
for the principal knew that children " ... live by appetite, 
and the desire for what is pleasant is found more in them 
than in anyone else. If, then, [the child ..• ] is not 
obedient and subordinate to its rulers, it will go far 
astray. 115 It is necessary to instruct the young in correct 
conduct. 
An appeal to general principles can be made only to 
those to "whom habituation to existing moral traditions is 
actually taught. 116 This seems to suggest that all conduct 
has a moral element, but what that ethical dimension might 
be has to be learned. As interest leads to impulse and 
desire, conduct then stands in "relation to thought, or as 
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3 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 290. Although Dewey has 
earlier (pp. 256-57) defined "interest" by the three 
characteristics "wholehearted," "persistent," and "impar-
tial," he seems to be using the word in a more conventional 
sense here. 
4 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 190. 
5 Aristotle, tm, 1119b6-8. 
6 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 163. 
an~ of an object to be attained,"7 the safety of the 
children in the school. 
Morality of the human act 
In response to the question of the extent to which 
conduct can be said to be "moral," Aquinas claims that some 
actions, such as walking in a field or picking up a straw, 
are "indifferent."8 One could object that even if there are 
such actions devoid of any moral element, they can take 
place only in utter social isolation. In any other circum-
stance there must surely be a moral element to human 
conduct, even if it is still not clear just how any conduct 
may be said to be "moral." 
Clearly, moral action in some way has to be "social" 
even if it is not "public." That is, human activity, even 
some actions that might never be performed in public, has a 
"human" element, that is, such activity is common to the 
nature of all human persons. Without yet considering what 
"moral" actually means, it appears that "moral" activity is 
synonymous with "human" activity. 
In society it is easier to determine what is moral by 
ascertaining what is appropriate to the group than to rely 
on individual judgment. Edward Westermarck maintains that 
conduct includes both individual and group action as 
7 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 191. 
8 Aquinas, ST I-II 18.9. 
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activities adhering to custom or law. He defines customs as 
public habits that in the strictest sense involve rules 
based on society's ideas of conduct and that must demon-
strate two characteristics, habitualness and obligatoriness. 
Therefore, not every public habit is a custom.9 If an action 
is not obligatory or binding in some way, it is merely a 
habit that upon reflection will disclose no underlying moral 
considerations. Thus, some conduct may indeed be morally 
indifferent at least with regard to the expectations of 
society, even if it has some underlying consideration on the 
part of the individual. 
Customary morality 
Is it possible that, even if morality does not inhere 
in all individual acts, society in some way provides an 
ethos in which all action has a moral dimension? In a 
primitive society, custom may be the sole rule for conduct, 
but not every member of a group need share the moral ideas 
upon which a custom is based even if all may "aver to the 
custom. 11 10 A more sophisticated society codifies customs as 
rules of conduct and enforces these laws as a means of 
social control, as Westermarck says, both from considera-
tions of social utility and from a sense of justice. Laws 
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9 Edward Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the 
Moral Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1912), p. 159. 
10 Westermarck, p. 161. 
may express the moral ideas of acceptable conduct held by 
most or all members of a society or may, unlike a custom, 
"express the ideas, or simply the will, of a few, or even of 
a single individual"ll sovereign and impose control on the 
members of a society. Thus, there is also a possibility of 
bad law that might not even be overcome by a Hobbesian 
concept that the will of the commonweal was sufficient to 
enact good laws for the commonweal. 
That law can be considered "bad" or "good" demon-
strates the fact of a moral dimension to all social action 
as conduct based on custom. Thus every social act may be 
said to be in accordance (or conflict) with rules based on 
ideas of morality that deal with public and overt acts. 
What does this moral dimension to the social act mean 
for the individual person? If conduct is a social expression 
of moral ideas, what would bring an individual to act in 
accordance with or against the custom or law of a society? 
Dewey makes the distinction between "customary" and "re-
flective" morality. 
The former places the standards and rules of conduct 
in ancestral habit; the latter appeals to con-
science, reason, or to some principle which includes 
thought.12 
While, in our opening example, the subsequent conduct of 
parents and teachers might well be habitual response to 
11 Ibid., p. 167. 
12 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 162. 
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CHAPTER V 
IS DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF VIRTUE ARISTOTELIAN? 
Dewey makes a distinction between natural goods that 
appeal to immediate interest and desire and "moral good, 
that which is approved after reflection. 11 1 This distinction 
is one that demonstrates the role of reflective morality in 
ethics. That is, conduct which has its basis in reflective 
morality is characteristic of the person who can make the 
determination of actions that may be said to be "good," for 
both that individual and society. This aspect of character 
is called "virtue" and is found in the structures of the 
ethics of both Aristotle and Dewey. By examining the concept 
of virtue in each philosopher's work it is possible to claim 
that Dewey's view is Aristotelian. 
A concept of virtue as goodness dates from pre-
Homeric times in Greece. Aristotle developed the view that 
virtue was not so much the heroic state of being "good at," 
but rather being good for its own sake. In the Christian era 
ways of "being good" were enumerated until the whole 
catalogue of virtues fell into disuse. Virtue as an essen-
tial point attained by a specific process in the ethical 
1 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 207. 
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structure was lost -- or discarded as religious apparatus 
not appropriate to philosophical discourse. 
Dewey, however, considers the virtues important 
traits of good character in much the same way that Aristotle 
did. On Dewey's view "a list of virtues •.. cannot be given a 
fixed meaning, because each expresses an interest in objects 
and institutions which are changing."2 Similarly, Aristotle 
presents the virtues not as a fixed list of behaviors but 
rather as the different "states of character [that] should 
be formed and coordinated for the virtuous person's bene-
fit.113 That is, the "virtue" of any individual may differ 
from that of any other person as much as persons may differ 
in physical characteristics or in social environments. 
Although each philosopher considers the "cardinal" virtues 
of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom, such specific 
characteristic do not make a person virtuous, but rather the 
person's character is the expression of the virtue of the 
person. The virtuous person is one who has a balance of all 
the virtues to whatever degree necessary to live and 
participate in society. 
After presenting an enormous amount of historical, 
ethical, and philosophical thought in Ethics and the Limits 
2 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 255. 
3 Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 136. 
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of Philosophy,4 the contemporary British philosopher Bernard 
Williams concludes that Socrates' question, "How should one 
live?" is nowhere closer to being answered than when it was 
first asked. As Williams looks at the enterprise of philo-
sophy and how its various parts are related to that part 
called ethics, he suggests, first, that in this century all 
historical perspective has been lost and, second, analytic 
philosophy in particular has given us patterns of process 
that makes much of what is called "ethical theory" a cold 
rather than hedonistic -- calculus. I will try to show that 
this is not true of John Dewey, who has not only followed 
the lead of Aristotle -- a most historical figure -- but has 
also warmly enhanced Aristotle's classical ethical concept 
of virtue. 
Both Aristotle and Dewey had quite clear visions of 
"how one should live," and for each of them, their life as 
individuals was one in which they each considered the entire 
philosophical enterprise as both the reason for life and the 
goal. What they have shared with us is obviously not a 
blueprint for behavior. Rather, each philosopher's ethical 
"writing is a powerful exposition of the underlying universal 
principles of ~ humankind behaves. 
John Dewey also does consider modern ethical tradi-
tions, but clearly maintains that neither utilitarianism nor 
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4 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
deontoloqism alone is an adequate guide to how one should 
live. 5 Theory is not useful on a day-to-day basis except 
when one has the time to consider it. 
For what is called moral theory is but a more 
conscious and systematic raising of the question 
which occupies the mind of anyone ••• in the face of 
moral conflict 6 
What is needed is not a guide to how a person should live 
but rather a guide to what sort of person one is, should be, 
and can become. For Dewey this is a process consistent with 
his concept of conduct being informed by character which in 
turn informs conduct. That element of character as process 
as well as manifest in action is virtue. 
Virtue in moral theory 
The theory, if it can be called such, that persons' 
good conduct is based on their character, is called in con-
temporary moral philosophy, "virtue ethics." While deon-
tologists and utilitarians proliferate in abundant and 
fractional variety, most proponents of virtue theory seem to 
agree that the virtuous person would readily use the tools 
provided by other moral philosophies yet adhere rigidly to 
none of them. This appears to be what Dewey proposes. While 
Dewey has not actually proposed some sort of "virtue 
ethics," his "reflective morality" specifically requires 
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5 See also "Three Independent Factors in Morals," [LW: 
5 ] pp • 2 7 8 - 2 8 8 • 
6 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 164. 
human conduct modified and enhanced by the response of 
others, to take a direction Dewey calls "virtuous." 
The basis of virtue ethics is found in the classical 
Greek tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Although Dewey has 
in his writings expressed his pleasure at reading Plato, he 
makes no such reference to Aristotle. This is not surprising 
as, unlike Plato's Republic, the Nicomachean Ethics was not 
composed_ as a text but reads like what it is, a set of 
lecture notes and outlines probably compiled by Aristotle's 
students -- not particularly pleasurable reading. Dewey also 
may have been highly antipathetic to some late nineteenth 
century interpretations of Aristotle? and chose not to deal 
with any such concerns while collaborating on an ethics 
textbook. However, it is clearly upon Aristotle's account of 
virtue that Dewey draws for his share of the 1908 Ethics.a 
Dewey is still consistent with Aristotle in his 
account of virtue in the 1932 Ethics. Abraham Edel and 
Elizabeth Flower say, in their introduction to the 1932 
Ethics, that Dewey's ethical theory has undergone con-
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7 Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History 
of His Development, Richard Robinson, trans. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1948). The issue appears to be the primacy 
of contemplation of God over against eudaemonia in Aris-
totle. One could also speculate Dewey was not yet far 
enough removed from his nee-Hegelian background (see Chapter 
III) to consider Aristotle on his own merits. 
8 The references to Plato are mainly contained in the 
chapters written by James Tufts in both the 1908 and the 
1932 editions. The concept of "wisdom" referred to later in 
this chapter is clearly not a Platonic view. 
siderable revision, which is, in fact, reflected in the 
later account of the role of virtue in morality. There is a 
continuity to Dewey's account of virtue in this edition that 
can be shown to be similar to Aristotle's account of virtue. 
This continuity is reflected in the expanded references 
Dewey gives to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.9 
If Dewey's account of virtue is derived from Aristo-
tle's, in some respects it may be said to be both more 
psychological and social than Aristotle's account.10 For 
instance_, Aristotle distinguishes between virtues of 
character that promote the person's happiness and moral 
virtues that promote the good of others. Dewey makes no such 
distinction. Virtue for him is integrity of character --
whole, persistent, impartial interest, and thus always in 
relation to the person's total environment.11 Yet Aristotle 
does bring his two notions of virtue together when he says 
that virtue of character as a whole is the same state of 
character as general justice, "complete virtue to the 
highest degree because it is the complete exercise of 
complete virtue. 11 12 And so too for Dewey, virtue as "com-
9 The 1908 Ethics gives only Books II, III, and IV of 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as references, whereas 
references to every book appear in the 1932 Ethics. 
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10 While I do not address this here, Dewey's section on 
generosity in the 1908 Ethics shows a Yankee spareness when 
compared to the spectrum of Aristotle's first four chapters 
of Book IV (1119b22-1125b27). 
11 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 257. 
12 Aristotle, NE, 1030a30. 
plete interest is the only way in which justice can be 
assured."13 In this, Dewey's view is certainly Aristotelian. 
In the next chapter we will see Aristotle's descrip-
tion of "virtue in action." It remains to be seen if Dewey 
provides for us in the late twentieth century a fuller 
explanation of the social nature of virtue than Aristotle. 
While what he says may be Aristotelian, the way in 
which Dewey says it is not. Dewey does not use much of the 
comm.on vocabulary agreed upon by scholars of Aristotle, and 
when he uses particular words of his own choosing, the 
meaning frequently slips and slides in context. I have tried 
to draw parallels with only the most clear concepts but 
sometimes have found that, the fuller the account, the 
muzzier the details became. This phenomenon will be seen in 
Chapter VI, which focusses on the social part of Dewey's 
account, Part III of the 1932 Ethics, in which there are no 
references to Aristotle. The rest of this chapter will deal 
with virtue in Dewey's account of habituation in moral 
conduct as well as with Aristotle's phronesis as the 
operating principle of moral conduct. That is Dewey's 
reflective morality is a process that has been fully 
described by Aristotle, although Dewey does not call our 
attention to the resemblence. 
13 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 259. 
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Acquiring virtue 
In the 1908 Ethics, Dewey had defined virtue as 
"habits of character whose effect is to sustain and spread 
the rational or common good."14 As we saw in Chapter III, 
these habits of conduct arise from natural capacities or 
interest deliberately encouraged, whether through specific 
instruction or through the practical assigning of value as 
rules. Both Aristotle and Dewey deny that virtue is in any 
way innate, although the disposition to virtue is part of 
the "good" of human nature. Natural capacities or dispo-
sitions, Aristotle says, "arise in us by nature ... we did not 
acquire them, but already had them •.• [V]irtues, by 
contrast, we acquire •.. 11 15 as habits of character. How, 
then, does habituation of an individual sustain and spread 
the rational and common good? 
For Aristotle, the highest goal for the person as a 
citizen is, after all, the practice of politics. He says 
that the role of a legislator is to make citizens good by 
habituating them, and thus "[the right] habituation is what 
makes the difference between a good political system and a 
·bad one.nl6 Or as Dewey says, " ••. society esteems and 
respects those attributes of an agent which tend to its own 
peace and welfare.nl7 
14 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 358. 
15 Aristotle, NE, 1103a27-33. 
16 Aristotle, NE, 1003b4-6. 
17 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 360. 
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Further, society's esteem and approval are essential 
to the process of habituation. That is to say, if the 
practice of virtue can be said to be the art of making 
choices well, we need to learn how to make good choices, to 
become habituated in choosing well. Choice is a basic 
element of human action. At the simplest level we choose or 
don't choose. Luckily, most babies come with the fundamental 
preference or choice for eating. A built-in mechanism, 
crying, may at first only signal undifferentiated discom-
fort, but the organism quickly develops a range of choices 
to convey to caregivers. Humans need other humans to provide 
availability of choice and to give meaning to some of the 
choices made. And it is through choices made that persons 
actually reveal and become the sort of self or moral agent 
they are. 18 
The choices we make result from many factors: 
temperament, a disposition to act, environment or psycho-
logical conditioning, or even part of the genetic package. 
Common sense tells us this is so, that persons have these 
attributes as part of what makes a person who they are, 
recognizable as this individual and not any other. The 
conglomerate of these attributes is what we call a person's 
character and what some of us call our self. But Dewey 
reminds us: 
18 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 287. 
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Selfhood or character is •.. not a mere means, an 
external instrument, of attaining certain ends. 
It is an agency of accomplishing consequences.19 
That is, there is some end-in-view to conduct, but a further 
end to which character contributes. 
Further, we are engaged in a lifelong process. A 
child's choices are developed through experience and 
instruction. Parents indicate by approval or disapproval 
whether a child has made an appropriate choice. Dewey says, 
society "instructs the individual as to the consequences of 
his act. 11 20 He also reminds us that we "must look behind the 
current valuation to the real value. Mere conformity to 
custom [should not be) conceived to be virtue. 11 21 
Virtue as practices 
This concept of the value or good of conduct, as 
being more than that which is approved by society, is 
consistent with what Macintyre calls "practices." A practice 
on his account is any coherent human activity through which 
goods internal to that particular activity are realized with 
the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human 
conceptions of the ends and goals involved are systemati-
cally extended. In this Aristotelian sense, not all human 
activities are considered practices. For example, an 
19 Ibid. 
2 0 Ibid. 
21 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 361. 
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activity may be aimless, that is without a specific end or 
goal. Some activities merely result in an external good, 
such as money or status, and as such may be interchangeable 
with any other similar activity with similar reward. In 
fact, most human activities do have goods "externally and 
contingently attached ••• by the accidents of •.. circum-
stances," but Macintyre's point is that, 
"(T]here are always alternative ways for achieving 
such goods, and their achievement is never to be had 
only by engaging in some particular kind of prac-
tice. 1122 
It is the undertaking of the particular practice, then, that 
yields internal goods. Thus, in Dewey's terms, current 
valuation, including conformity to custom, is analogous to 
external goods: real value is only to be found in internal 
goods. Practices as social phenomena will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
In Aristotle's discussion of virtue, he also defines 
goods as external and internal. Then of internal goods he 
distinguishes between intrinsic goods and useful goods. 
Useful goods are those that may be directed to a specific 
end. We may use many of these goods to achieve a rational 
plan that in itself may be a useful good ••. or to reach an 
intrinsic good, that is, something to be pursued for its own 
worth and value. As Dewey says, the end-in-view may become 
the means to yet some further end. While for Aristotle the 
22 Alisdair Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 251-252. 
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only thing ultimately worth pursuing appears the intrinsic 
primary good eudaemonia, good-spiritedness, or "happiness:" 
Dewey uses "identification of an agent's capacity with some 
aspect of the reasonable or common happiness," in yet 
another definition of virtue.23 Thus, there again is 
agreement that happiness in the broadest sense is some sort 
of principal good. It still must be made clear what role 
virtue plays in the enterprise. 
Virtue defined 
Happiness is not virtue; nor is it g virtue. On 
Aristotle's account, it is the ultimate end of all human 
actions, and, since all actions are attempts to achieve this 
end, it follows that all of our choices and actions can be 
said to be means to that end. Virtues are qualities, 
character traits, choice making processes, and principles 
that enable us to perform acts that are more likely to help 
us to achieve the primary good, happiness. Thus a good 
choice is a virtuous choice, or as Thomas Aquinas says: 
••• of those who are good and best in virtuous 
living, only those are illustrious and happy who 
actually perform good deeds. Hence it is better to 
say that happiness is a virtuous operation than 
virtue itself .24 
23 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 362. 
24 Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Vol. I, L.XII: C 153, p. 65. 
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Just as we found more than one sense of the word 
"choice" in action or conduct, so "virtue" may be used in 
different ways. Sometimes the terms choice and virtue are 
interchangeable. For instance, the "choice" to be courageous 
can also be described as an exercise of the "virtue" of 
courage. Thus, "a virtue" may be the name for a quality of 
human character. It may also be the quality of some end-in-
view or immediate goal, or it may be the quality of the 
execution of a plan itself: while at the same time the goal 
and the execution are often inseparable in the human act. 
That is, though useful goods may be used to achieve a plan, 
it is the intrinsic good of the plan itself from its 
conception through the excellence of execution that is to be 
rationally aimed at and achieved. Once again, here are two 
different senses of "virtue," as intrinsic good and as 
useful good. Which is to be preferred? For Aristotle, 
" ••• it matters quite a bit whether we suppose that 
the best good consists in possessing or in using, 
i.e. in a state or in an activity that actualizes 
that state. 11 25 
Dewey again defines virtue, this time as an attitude 
of interest. This for me triggers an image of a dog poised, 
paw up, head and back and tail forming a straight pointer to 
the quarry. But Dewey's "aspects of virtue" as interest 
summarized in both editions of the Ethics 26 appear to 
25 Aristotle, NE, 1098b25. 
26 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, pp. 363-64; 1932 Ethics, pp. 
256-57. 
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constitute a state rather than an activity. That is, 
wholehearted, persistent, and impartial interest are all 
needed to achieve an end, even if it should turn out to be 
the means to yet another end. 
For example, self-esteem or a sense of self worth is 
not just a quality that enhances activity. Nor is it merely 
a "process and becoming," as Aristotle would put it. It is a 
state from which one carries out one's intentions, one's 
plans. John Rawls describes self-esteem as that which gives 
us the assurance to undertake a plan with the "secure 
conviction" that it is worth carrying out, " ..• [and] a 
confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's 
power, to fulfill one's intentions. 11 27 
It seems then that such "ability" may be not just 
either useful or intrinsic, but rather both/and. So generos-
ity or temperance may not be virtues only as names for 
qualities of human character, but also are essential to an 
operation leading to happiness. But are virtues turned off 
and on for appropriate occasions? Could "happiness" be the 
only "virtue" after all? What happened to justice, which was 
discussed earlier in this chapter? Apparently virtue must be 
"grown into." For instance, Aristotle. distinguishes between 
"natural" and "full" virtue. 
For each of us seems to possess his type of character 
to some extent by nature, since we are just, brave, 
27 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 440. 
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prone to temperance, or have some other feature 
immediately from birth. However we still search for 
some other conditions as full goodness .•. for these 
natural states belong to children and to beasts as 
well [as to adults], but with out understanding ... 28 
It appears that virtue is a state, but all the 
activities in which persons engage may be simply what 
Aristotle would say are the natural virtues exercised. 
These seem then to be consistent only with what Dewey calls 
"customary morality. 11 29 However, some other condition is 
needed for full virtue, even when particular virtues are not 
"in operation," as it were. Aquinas calls it prudence and 
names it as the general principle of operation for moral or 
full virtue, that is, understanding or rationality.30 
Dewey has a name for it, too. He says, in the 1908 
Ethics, "Wisdom, or (in modern phrase) conscientiousness, is 
the nurse of all the virtues. 11 31 For the Greeks, wisdom is 
the highest of the virtues and Aristotle distinguishes 
between sophia, wisdom concerned purely with study and the 
processes of thought, and phronesis, most usually translated 
as intelligence or prudence, both of which are misleading, 
alas, for the current meaning of the former is often limited 
to mental capacity and agility and the latter to over-
28 Aristotle, NE, 1144b. 
29 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 255. 
30 Aquinas, CNE, Vol. I, L.XI: C1280, p. 602. 
31 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 364. 
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cautious narrow-mindedness, or. as Dewey says, "a kind of 
sublimated egoism."32 
So Dewey offers the word "conscientiousness" and 
while ignoring its possible misinterpretation as punctilious 
attention to the dictates of conscience, defines it as the 
intelligent or deliberate character at the heart of a 
voluntary act. In his early work, Dewey began to describe 
what was to become his concept of conscientiousness in the 
character of the individual as that "habit of judging moral 
situations ..• (as] the key to the direction and to the 
remaking of all other habits. 11 33 
Process of reflective morality 
In Chapter IV we saw how reflective morality leads to 
making moral choices and seeking moral ends-in-view. 
Aristotle emphasizes the role of reason in character of the 
act as well as of the individual in another description of 
virtue as: 
not merely the state expressing correct reason, 
but .•• the state involving correct reason ... and it is 
intelligence that is correct reason in this area .•. We 
cannot be fully good without intelligence or intelli-
gent without virtue of character.34 
What then is this intelligence or "prudence " without which 
we cannot be fully good .•. or be said to have full virtue? It 
32 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 258. 
33 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 375. 
34 Aristotle, NE, 1145a5. 
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is a process with three stages and levels and steps within 
the second stage. Phronesis begins with what Aristotle calls 
"good" deliberation over one's own eudamonia or state. Such 
deliberation leads to the second stage, forming a supposi-
tion, and the first of two levels of decision-making, 
prohairesis. The steps within this level include identifying 
the rational desire, calculating about how best to achieve 
it, and actually making the decision to go ahead. The second 
level, praxis, involves acting on the decision made about 
the supposition, with the steps of forming an intentional, 
voluntary desire to act, undertaking the act, and completing 
the entire activity. This brings us to the third stage of 
phronesis, which is to once again engage in deliberation. 
Thus, phronesis or prudence is an ongoing reflective 
process that at the second stage may lead to decision that 
may in turn lead to action. I would suggest that it is this 
second stage where Dewey's "problem-solving" takes place as 
a stage in reflective morality. If a supposition is formed, 
it may or may not be identified as a problem, need calcula-
tions of how to act or not to act upon it, and require a 
decision to go ahead or not. These steps are a process 
complete in itself within the larger process and may lead 
either on to praxis or back to the third stage. This is not 
an endless repetition however, but more of a reconstruction, 
with an end-in-view at each level, as in Dewey's reflective 
morality. 
85 
In the same way as in phronesis, the process 
operating in reflective morality is not exclusively 
rational, for it depends on the material of experience for 
the evaluation of courses of action, skill of execution or 
techne of the action, and the ongoing evaluation of both the 
process and the arrival at the end-in-view, which is a point 
at which the process can begin again. 
Conclusion 
In the 1932 edition, Dewey wrote an entire chapter in 
which "moral judgment is the general principle of operation 
for reflective morality. 11 35 The operation, like Aristotle's, 
is one of moral deliberation and valuation, initially based, 
as we have seen, on choice and the moral development of the 
self. While perhaps not as refined, this is in several ways 
consistent with Aristotle's phronesis. And although Dewey's 
effort to render reflective morality into social action is 
less than satisfactory, it may be appropriate to consider 
that Aristotle never attempted such a thing. However, 
Dewey's exposition of the person in the process of reflec-
tive morality may be rooted in the social context to a 
greater extent than Aristotle. His deeper insight that our 
conduct is informed by our awareness of others makes virtue 
in the individual more dependent on society. Nonetheless, 
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35 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, Chapter 14, "Moral Judgment and 
Knowledge," pp. 263-284. 
both Aristotle and Dewey have attempted the resolution of 
the contrast between "man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-
could-be-i f-he-real i zed-his-essential-nature." 36 
36 Macintyre, p. 52. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ETHICS IN SOCIETY 
There is some way in which persons continually relate 
to one another that initiates, sustains, and furthers such 
relationship. As we will see in this chapter, Aristotle 
calls thls bond of relationship philia, often translated as 
friendship. Dewey does not have an account of friendship as 
such in his part of the 1932 Ethics, but his discussion of 
what it is that binds persons together in society, particu-
larly in brief references to that which Dewey calls love, 
can be shown to be remarkably similar to Aristotle's philia. 
The claim of this chapter is that Dewey and Aristotle are 
saying the same thing. 
Society and the individual 
Up to this point the discussion has focussed on the 
individual rather than on the group. Although ethics and 
ethical behavior are manifest in society, it has been more 
important to determine whether Dewey's account of ethics in 
the individual person is Aristotelian. We have seen that the 
human act of reflective morality includes the element of 
virtue in both the character of an agent and of the conduct 
and consequences of action. We also have seen that such 
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moral reasoning both on Dewey's and on Aristotle's account 
has a social function rather than merely the formal, 
rational systematization of rules for the individual. Or as 
Dewey says: 
The genuinely moral person is one, then, in whom the 
habit of regarding all capacities and habits of self 
from the social standpoint is formed and active.l 
This gives some indication of the role of the individual in 
society. What is the role of society for the person? One 
role of society is that it establishes norms of conduct, but 
these, by and large, are on the level of customary morality. 
Society also functions in the role of educating its members, 
as well as the milieu in which human experience take place. 
Society as educator 
The community undertakes the role of educating its 
members. Whether this education takes place in the family or 
a tutorial or an institutional setting, the goal is to 
convey those skills considered necessary in a particular 
society. N.A. Lawrence says that on the level of elementary 
education: 
There seems no real quarrel between Aristotle's 
notion of education as disciplined cultivation of the 
intellect and Dewey's notion of education as 
development of skills through motivated experi-
ence ... 2 
1 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 271. 
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2 Nathaniel A. Lawrence, "Aristotle: Education as Self-
Realization," in Robert S.Brumbaugh and Nathaniel A. 
Lawrence, Philosophers on Education: Six Essays on Founda-
Both Aristotle and Dewey, however, consider all of the 
institutions of society to be educative, not just the 
schools. A.bout this Dewey says: 
In the sense in which culture signifies nurture of 
powers of growth and increased fullness of the life 
of the mind, the ulterior function of all definite 
modes of organization, political and otherwise, is 
cultural.3 
Insofar as inculturation is synonymous with education, the 
goal is for the individual to take part in society as a 
reasoning and understanding member. To do so, persons must 
first develop the capacity to conduct their own lives and 
then become involved in the life of the group. 
This group that we call society Aristotle called the 
polis. Ethics involves the capacity to conduct one's own 
life well. Engaging in the good conduct of society Aristotle 
calls politics • 
•.. the one that, more than any other, is the ruling 
science ••. it is the one that prescribes which of the 
(other] sciences ought to be studied in cities •.. even 
the most honoured capacities, e.g. generalship~ 
household management and rhetoric, are subordinate to 
it. Further (politics] uses the other sciences con-
cerned with action, and moreover legislates what must 
be done and what avoided.4 
R.S. Brumbaugh points out that for the Greeks "effec-
tive community membership is a necessary condition for self-
tions of Western Thought (Lanham, Maryland: University 
Press of America, 1968, reprinted 1986), p. 73. 
3 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 364. 
4 Aristotle, NE, 1094a25-1094b7. 
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realization ••• and in much the same way Dewey sees self-
realization as an essentially social process." 5 
Individuals are interdependent .•. [While] independence 
of character and judgment is to be prized ..• [it] does 
not signify separateness; it is something to be 
displayed in relation to others •.• the human being is 
an individual because of and in relations with 
others.6 
Society as a milieu 
One vital function of society is that it provides a 
milieu in which we can engage in activities or practices 
that on Macintyre's account have goods internal to them. 
Practices must meet two criteria. First, the practice must 
be specific in kind, and second, the practice can only be 
known by the actual experiencing of it. Thus membership in 
an institution such as the American Medical Association 
specifies only the practice of being a member, which 
although such membership can be experienced by attending 
meetings and reading the journal, is neither the specific 
practice of the healing arts, nor can it ever be experienced 
as such. In the same way, our citizenship is nominal or an 
external good unless and until we actually exercise our 
constitutional franchise, specifically through the experi-
ence of voting. 
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5 Robert s. Brumbaugh, "Rousseau: Emile, A Romance of 
Education," in Philosophers on Education: Six Essays, p. 92. 
6 Dewey, 1932 Ethics~ p. 227. 
The second criterion of a practice is that it must 
specifically aim to ensure standards of excellence. Clearly 
the AMA does propose such standards but in fact does not 
have the means of enforcing them because the actual practice 
is the healing arts and it is by membership in the medical 
profession, not the AMA, that the internal good of excel-
lence can be realized. 
Not every human activity experienced as a "practice 
with internal goods and standards of excellence"? involves 
joining some organization. There are other human activities 
that involve qualities such as compassion and loyalty and 
courage that are essential to human practices. These are the 
virtues that Macintyre defines as: 
... an acquired human quality the possession and 
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those 
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of 
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods.a 
So it is through the exercise of virtue that the moral 
development of the individual that is essential to the moral 
development of society takes place. It is this "social 
virtue" that attaches to the institution, not merely to the 
elements that enable the practices of the person. 
Further, although practices are essential to human 
institutions, there is a mutual interdependence between the 
institution and its members. For instance, institutions may 
7 Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 253. 
8 Ibid. 
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need to be concerned with external goods that are required 
to sustain the practices of which the institution is the 
bearer. As Macintyre says: 
[I]ndeed so intimate is the relationship of practices 
to institutions ••• that [they] characteristically form 
a single causal order in which the ideals and 
creativity of the practice is always vulnerable .•. and 
the essential function of the virtues •.. justice, 
courage, and truthfulness ... [enables practices to] 
resist the corrupting power of institutions.9 
Dewey was well aware that there are some aspects of modern 
technological society that have made it almost impossible to 
achieve human excellence. As early as 1916 he said that: 
Aristotle was certainly right when he said that "any 
occupation or art or study deserves to be called 
mechanical if it renders the body or soul or 
intellect of free persons unfit for the exercise and 
practice of excellence. 11 10 
Dewey also understood the Greek view of what constituted a 
free person. "Because Greek industry was so largely .•• 
[based] on servile labor, all industrial activity was 
regarded by Greek thought as a mere means •.. " Thus, the 
persons engaged in such labor could not enjoy a truly human 
and rational life. However, Dewey accepts that Aristotle has 
drawn "a just conclusion from the assumed premises, [that] 
there are classes of men who are necessary materials of 
society but who are not integral parts of it. 11 11 
9 Ibid., p. 256. 
10 Dewey, Democracy and Education, [MW: 9] p. 264. 
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11 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 369 [LW: 1] p. 277. 
What then enables persons successfully to engage in 
practices? How do individuals function together in society? 
What binds them? 
Some virtues or qualities of character such as 
courage or truthfulness have been named as necessary to 
achieving excellence in practices, which necessarily are 
social activities. Justice results from the successful 
achievement of excellence in virtue of character and of 
conduct. Justice is, as it were, a "social" virtue, 
recognized by others who experience what Tufts calls "an 
impulse toward a life in common. 11 12 Here Tufts uses the 
Greek word philia as that "which expresses itself in 
friendship," But then immediately refers to "a unity of 
disposition and purpose (homonoia) ... which may be called 
"political friendship 111 13 
Although Tufts also quotes Aristotle on friendship in 
his chapter on marriage and the family in Part III,14 
Dewey's only reference to friendship15 is a discussion of 
Epicureanism as a philosophy that holds that "(p)rivate 
12 Tufts, 1932 Ethics, p. 113. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 450. 
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15 Dewey does include friendship with "books ... [and] 
the fostering of esthetic delights" among those pleasures 
"more likely to give rise to future occasions of enjoyment" 
in this same discussion of Epicureanism as a "doctrine which 
will always flourish ••. when social conditions are troubled 
and harsh," but this comment adds nothing to the matter at 
hand. 1932 Ethics, pp. 200-202. 
friendship is better than public life."16 Before we can 
discover if Dewey offers a view of the relationships that 
can bind individuals in society, it is necessary to examine 
Aristotle's notion of friendship. 
Aristotle on friendship 
While virtuous practice in one's own affairs is good, 
it is only in relation to others and in association that the 
virtue of justice is practiced. Aristotle defines justice as 
"complete virtue," or: 
•.. virtue to the highest degree ... because the person 
who has justice is able to exercise virtue in 
relation to another, not only in what concerns 
himself •.. but in what relates to another.17 
One might argue that the act of exercising the virtue of 
justice in relation to another could be called friendship. 
While such an act could be said to be done by a person 
exercising the virtue of friendliness, Aristotle's concept 
of friendship is so large that to call it simply a vi~tue of 
character is not sufficient. In the first place it can not 
be extended toward inanimate objects as can, for example, 
the virtue of courage. Rather, it is the virtue that is 
involved in all interpersonal relations of which Aristotle 
distinguishes three types: good, pleasant, and useful.ls 
16 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 114. 
17 Aristotle, NE, 1129b30. 
18 Aristotle, NE, 1156a3. 
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It is not possible here to consider all of Aris-
totle' a different perspectives on friendship. Rather the 
focus must be on the social, the community as the highest 
form of friendship in the domain of the political. Here 
association may be pleasant, if the persons involved are 
acquainted with one another, but for Aristotle, personal 
relations of intimacy whether of family or friends are not 
essential to community. It is possible to have useful 
relations such as business association in which the parties 
concerned may not even know one another, but this is not the 
highest form of friendship in the polis. 
Political friendship must extend beyond a circle of 
immediate friends, but it must also involve more than an 
attitude of goodwill toward other members of the community. 
For the primary concern of justice is the good of the 
political community (1129b17-19); and if rational 
agents have good reason to be concerned about the 
good of the political community, they have good 
reason to extend their altruistic concern in the 
particular direction that leads to justice and to the 
choice of just action for its own sake.19 
So concern for the good by good persons with good reason for 
good action is served by friendship in the community. 
Another way to put this is to say that the ethos of the 
community is one of friendship in that all of the members 
are engaged in ethical conduct for its own sake. Recalling 
that Dewey does not directly address the topic of friendship 
in his Ethics but that the word for friendship in Greek is 
19 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, 215. 
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philia, which can also be translated as love, we can turn to 
see what Dewey has to say on this matter. 
Dewey's view of ethics in society 
In his discussion of virtue, Dewey argues that 
individual virtues cannot be taken in isolation, not should 
they be treated as other than phases of "an interpenetrated 
whole •.. the positive harmony characteristic of integrated 
interest. 11 20 He uses the term "love" to define such an 
attitude of interest. He names the virtues of courage and 
wisdom as essential to the realization of: 
... such a complete interest [that is] the only way in 
which justice can be assured. For it includes as part 
of itself an impartial concern for all conditions 
which affect the common welfare, be they specific 
acts, laws, economic arran~ements, political 
institutions, or whatever. 1 
Dewey is using interest or love in the same way as Aristotle 
in using friendship with regard to the community. Such love 
is not just what is good for the person or merely pleasant. 
Nor is Dewey treating simply personal relations or relations 
of utility. 
At the end of his final chapter in the 1932 Ethics, 
Dewey writes of "social unity," and defines it as "interest 
in the affairs of the community as if they were one's own 
concern," and he further says "love of country is intrin-
sically extension of love for one's friends and neigh-
20 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 258. 
21 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 259. 
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bors.n22 Dewey's view of a global community of nations is 
clearly much more than Aristotle ever envisaged. However, I 
would maintain that in his very restraint in the use of what 
he would consider overly emotional language, in his use of 
the word love only with regard to morality in society, that 
Dewey is very near to Aristotle's view of that which binds 
persons in community. 
22 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 368. 
98 
CHAPI'ER VII 
DEWEY'S AND ARISTOTLE'S TELEOLOGY 
This chapter will look at the end or telos of Dewey's 
and Aristotle's ethics. We have seen that ethical conduct 
and character can be described in terms of virtue in the 
individual. The relationship of persons in society can be 
described in terms of philia or friendship or love. Dewey's 
reflective morality functions in the same way as Aristotle's 
practical wisdom, or phronesis, enabling a person to make 
good choices and choosing the good. Society, or the polis, 
provides the necessary social environment where all this 
takes place. What is the end of all this? Is there some 
final or ultimate good toward which ethics leads us? 
Dewey says that the question of what ends a man 
should live for is only meaningful in a reflective morality, 
"[t]he question of what ends a man should live for does not 
arise as a general problem in customary morality. 11 1 What 
this means in effect is that the end of customary morality 
is that it should be observed. Reflective morality requires 
something more, however, that is, goals and behavior 
consistent with: 
1 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 184. 
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The development of inclusive and enduring aims is 
the necessary condition of the application of 
reflection in conduct; indeed they are two names for 
the same fact.2 
Thus the ends of reflective morality and the process itself 
are one on Dewey's account. 
Reflective morality in Aristotle's terms is virtuous 
conduct expressed in an individual through a character that 
has been formed through habit and education. The aim of 
practical wisdom or reflection in conduct is arete or 
excellence in the practice of ethics and politics. The word 
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eudaimonos can be used as an adjective to describe such good 
practices; that is, excellence of character and conduct has 
both for the person and for society the inclusive and 
enduring aim or goal of well-being or eudaimonia. Before we 
can discuss whether eudaimonia can be seen in some way as an 
ultimate end, however, it is necessary to look at how a 
person moves toward the recognition or the understanding of 
human action and experience in order to develop any such end 
or goal. 
Aristotle's archai and logoi 
It is through dialectical reflection on experience 
that we become aware of the archai, the reasons "why" things 
are as they are. Those reasons derive from the logoi or 
meanings that are generated by sensory perceptions and go to 
2 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 185. 
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make up what we recognize as an experience. It is upon these 
experiences that we engage in the process of dialectic to 
discover universals by induction, that is, to account for 
the underlying concepts or principles implicit in the 
particular instances. "When the observation of particular 
instances is often repeated, the universal that is in them 
becomes plain. 11 3 The archai, then, are the underlying 
concepts or the basis of recognizing, understanding, and 
learning the logos or meaning of future experiences. 
It can be shown that for Dewey a similar structure 
and function are contained in the concept of reconstruction 
of experience. It remains to be seen if this is a useful 
basis for Dewey's teleology. That is, does Dewey also have 
some ultimate end, such as eudaimonia, reached by a process 
that is similar to Aristotle's? 
Dewey's reconstruction of experience 
One could say that the meaning of reconstruction of 
experience is contained in the juxtaposition of the words 
rather than in the individual words themselves, that is, the 
dynamic or functional relationship of the words reflects the 
dynamic meaning of the expression. It is, however, possible 
to analyze some meanings of the word "reconstruction" and 
its relationship to the word "experience" in order to show 
3 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, BkII, 19: lOOaS, 
100b4, 5. 
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that, while not interchangeable, the meaning of each word 
and its underlying concept depends on the other for complete 
understanding. 
As an underlying concept, or arche, reconstruction as 
remodelling (or building again) generally is done with 
intention of some improvement in the original structure, to 
make it better or more efficient. If we are discussing human 
persons or groups, one such intention or aim of reconstruc-
tion, then, could be "social efficiency," which Dewey 
defines as 11 ••• the cultivation of power to join freely and 
fully in shared or common activities. 11 4 
The problem with this definition of reconstruction is 
that it seems to require the participation of more than one 
individual for the actual manifestation. Can reconstruction 
be only a group activity? Surely the individual can engage 
in the enterprise on his or her own? The definition of 
reconstruction as social efficiency gives us a clue, in that 
it tacitly indicates that it may not be the group that is 
"reconstructing" but the individual who cultivates some 
means of participating in the group. The person, then, is 
engaged in the experience of reconstruction. 
Why then are common or group activities needed at 
all? From Dewey's perspective it may be that the group 
provides some necessary element for the enterprise. That is, 
4 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (MW: 9] p. 123. 
that only in shared or common activity can experience take 
place that is the material of reconstruction. 
One might object that a person can have "experience" 
completely alone. This would be true, however, only if such 
experience excluded any reference to prior experience or 
knowledge or memory that at whatever remove would necessar-
ily involve contact with an other. That is, all that we are 
aware of_ involves experience of other persons. Further, it 
is only by experiencing "the other" that we develop an 
awareness of our "self." 
In a extended discussion of the self, George Herbert 
Mead suggests that the commonality of experience of events 
exists only in the spatial-temporal world each individual 
experiences through the consciousness that is unique to 
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human beings. That is, neither the location nor the duration 
of an experience will ever be the same for any two indivi-
duals. We can nonetheless deal with our subjective worlds, 
anticipating and planning eventualities, and engage in all 
forms of social conduct through the functioning of both 
"self and the mind. 11 5 
However, a person's awareness of self depends on 
awareness of others. It is clear that for Mead a person is a 
social animal who must experience a group and the attitude 
5 George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present 
(Chicago, London: Open Court Publishing Company, 1932), ed. 
Arthur E. Murphy; Lectures upon the Paul Carus Foundation, 
Third Series, plus supplementary essays. p. 178. 
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of others before she can experience herself. This does not 
necessarily mean that exposure to great numbers of other 
people is necessary before a sense of self can develop. In 
his discussion of developmental play, Mead is particularly 
clear that the imitative acts of role-playing are the self-
stimulation of the responses of a limited other, that is, 
the person's own experience limits how the "other" can 
respond. As play becomes a game with rules and structure, 
roles are formalized and the person must become aware of all 
of these in order to participate fully, even when the 
activity is solitary or, as we say, takes place in the 
person's imagination. The person develops a sense of the 
"generalized other" that enables him to play a role himself 
and also to anticipate the actions of other players, even if 
they are not present.6 Mead has given us a view of an early 
stage of what Dewey calls reconstruction of experience. Now 
we need to look at where all this takes place -- where the 
real "others" are -- in society. 
Reconstruction of experience and social reality 
The experience of reconstruction increases the 
ability of the self to undertake subsequent experience 
through practice and experiment. It is through experience of 
both self and others that an individual develops what Alfred 
6 Ibid., p. 186. 
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Schutz calls organized knowledge of "social reality."7 It is 
possible to acquire this knowledge because, as we have seen, 
to be social is to be intersubjective; that is we can share 
experiences and those experiences are meaningful to us and 
to others in that we are able to recognize and grasp others' 
actions, motives, and goals. Thus, "our common sense 
knowledge of everyday life"S enables us to describe and name 
some experienced attributes of social reality. 
First, Schutz says, our lives are "structurally 
socialized" in that if we change places with any other 
person we will experience substantially the same perspective 
as the other. This reciprocity of perspectives makes it 
possible to place ourselves "in another's position" to 
examine the particular instance. The examination of the 
immediate experience enables us to enhance both our experi-
ence of self and of others as the reconstruction of the 
"material of experience" proceeds. 
Second, the greater part of our knowledge, its 
content and forms, is genetically socialized, derived from 
past experience and approved in institutionalized forms, 
such as Dewey's customary morality. The individual can 
choose to accept, examine, change or reject the content, 
7 Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I: The Problem of 
Social Reality, ed. and intro. by Maurice Natanson with 
preface by H.L. Van Breda (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1962), p. 53. 
8 Ibid., p. 55. 
thus enabling the reconstruction process. By identifying 
some of the basic meaning of experience, at least one 
discovers those things that are biologically and physically 
determined. 
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Finally, although knowledge actually may vary between 
individuals, this variety is accepted as being an appro-
priate distribution that somehow levels off and no one is 
concerned that everyone does not know everything that 
everyone else knows. This social distribution between 
individuals makes it possible to universalize "common 
knowledge." Reconstruction of individuals' experiences in a 
group situation must draw on the acceptance of this common-
ality to reach consensus, for example. 
As we keep in mind these attributes of social reality 
Schutz offers as the logoi that make up the "material of 
experience," it is possible to recognize the archai of many 
of our experiences and thus advance the enterprise of 
reconstruction. But what is the end of all this? Is recon-
struction of social reality in some sense the goal? 
If so, the group or shared activity, actual or in 
memory or imagination, is essential for the experience of 
reconstruction, but this is not the word order of our 
original expression. Although we have shown there is some 
relationship that may even be called a dynamic interdepen-
dence between the terms, what then is "reconstruction of 
experience"? 
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We may return to the definition of social efficiency 
for the answer. The expression "reconstruction of exper-
ience" refers to a "power," a mode of human action whether 
by disposition, habituation, or virtuous intention, that can 
be cultivated and that enables the individual to join 
"freely and fully" in ••• what? There is always a threat of 
circularity in Dewey, and at this point it seems that 
reconstruction of experience leads to more of the same ad 
infinitum. But we have already seen in Chapter II that 
Dewey's many definitions of the word "experience" often have 
this apparent circularity. Perhaps we need to ask, Is there 
a further purpose or end to "reconstruction of experience" 
that is contained in, but not limited to, definition? 
Dewey clearly intends there to be an end that could 
be described as something like the realization of the self 
both leading to and resulting from participation in society. 
"Reconstruction of experience" is the shorthand expression 
of how this may be achieved. It is not an end in itself, but 
is descriptive of a dynamic process or activity that leads 
toward an end. Nor is reconstruction of experience intended 
just to be the means to an end. Once again, there is an 
element of both/and, in the same way as Dewey says that: 
The self is not a mere means to producing conse-
quences because the consequences, when of a moral 
kind, enter into the formation of the self and the 
self enters into them.9 
9 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 286. 
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Somehow the reconstruction of experience functions as an 
ongoing process with a structure that can change and grow as 
the process proceeds. As the meanings of experience are 
recognized, these become the basis for the continuation of 
the process, the archai underlying the further recognition 
of logos, in Aristotle's terms. 
Is reconstruction of experience teleological? 
Before one can say whether reconstruction of 
experience is teleological, on must define both the 
predicate and the subject of the statement. That which is 
teleological has some end or goal or purpose. A teleological 
ethics, for example, looks to the end result of an act, 
whereas a deontological ethics looks to the extent to which 
a moral principle of obligation, such as duty or promise-
keeping, requires that the act be performed. Teleological 
explanation is in terms of some end that may or may not lead 
to a further end. These are not ends in a causal sense, that 
is, landing in the parking lot does not "cause" the cat to 
be dropped out the window. Nor are ends just functional, as 
excretion is a function of the kidney, because that function 
is part of the function of the entire organism. 
Ends also must be goal-directed or purposive, whether 
in the short term as means to yet another end or as an end 
that is, in ethical terms, some "good" in itself, such as 
knowledge or self-fulfillment, or some balance of "better" 
good over "lesser" good. 
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Dewey's best simple definition of reconstruction of 
experience is the " ••. reorganization of experience which 
adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases 
ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.nlO 
This reorganization is purposive, an intelligent direction 
and redirection of action to an end. It also involves 
innumerable short term "ends-in-view" leading to a unity of 
purpose or rational integration of the person in his 
environment as yet another and further end of reconstruction 
of experience. 
So ends-in-view lead to some further end of recon-
struction of experience. Dewey writes about the structure of 
experience as "three deepening levels or three expanding 
spheres of context." The first level is the direct personal 
experience of the thinker. The second is social or anthropo-
logical world we call "culture." The third level is the 
philosophical context of "the boundless multiplicity of the 
concrete experiences of humanity when they are dealt with 
gently and humanely, [that] will naturally terminate in some 
sense of the structure of any and all experience. 11 11 If such 
a statement sounds like some part of a definition of 
experience as an elaborate teleological structure, that is 
10 Dewey, Democracy and Education, [MW: 9] p. 82. 
11 [LW: 6] pp. 3-28. 
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indeed the case. In his introduction to one of the collected 
works editions Sidney Hook describes Dewey's use of the term 
to refer to "a pattern of events in which the organism is 
deliberately or with some awareness attending or acting upon 
something and undergoing or suffering the consequences of 
the action."12 
Thus, reconstruction of experience is teleological in 
that unity of purpose as an end requires some sense or 
awareness of the structure of experience leading to the 
rational integration of the person in the pattern of events 
of her environment as an end. These are not two ends, but 
rather aspects of the end that is the dynamic ongoing 
process of reconstruction by, for, and in the person. If 
some ultimate end is sought, it may be for the person to be 
the most that that person can be. 
Ultimate ends 
We have now reached the point where there must be 
some ultimate end to which the practice of ethics aims. For 
both Dewey and Aristotle, it seems, the end of good conduct 
is human welfare. But is there some ultimate end beyond "the 
functioning of man's various powers under the guidance of 
intelligence," as Randall puts it?13 Dewey maintains that 
12 Democracy and Education, (MW: 9] p. 10. 
13 Randall, Aristotle, p. 253. 
although "we set up this and that end to be reached ... the 
end is growth. 11 14 
Growth as the ultimate end for Dewey 
The Introduction of the 1932 Ethics discusses the 
moral life in terms of growth, " •.. a process in which man 
becomes more rational, more social, and finally more 
mora1.nl5 It is through reconstruction of experience that 
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this growth·process takes place. That is, just as Dewey sees 
education as reconstruction of experience, he also em-
phasizes "that the educative process can be identified with 
growth when that is understood in terms of the active 
participle, growing. 11 16 Thus, both the process and the end 
of reconstruction of experience are, in fact, growth. Since 
the practice of ethics involves reconstruction of ex-
perience, the end of ethics is growth. 
What is the ultimate end for Aristotle? 
Just as character is inseparable from conduct, so too 
is ethics inseparable from politics. Although ethics is 
concerned with the happiness and virtue of individuals and 
politics with the best sort of society, both are concerned 
14 1932 Ethics, p. 306. 
15 1932 Ethics, p. 13. 
16 Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Macmil-
lan, 1938; Collier Books, 1963), p. 36 [LW: 13] p. 19. 
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with human conduct that will bring about human good.17 
Ethical and political knowledge must be intellectual as well 
as practical, and its aim is to strive for the good of human 
conduct . 
... good deliberation is correctness that reflects 
what is beneficial, about the right thing, in the 
right way and at the right time ..• unconditionally 
good deliberation is the sort that correctly promotes 
the unconditional good (ie. the highest good]18 
What Dewey would call reflective morality must be just that, 
good action based on good reflection about good things. What 
then is the highest good? Good conduct is "good because it 
gives satisfaction to human feelings .•. a means to [indivi-
dual] happiness or self-contentment ... whereas virtuous 
conduct affords us happiness apart from the result."19 
Clearly, the highest good is not just that which is good for 
something or a means, but is that which is in some way good 
in itself. 
Good deliberation is good for something, obviously, 
but there is still another level of deliberation. First, 
unconditionally good deliberation must extend into one's 
whole life, past and future, and take into consideration 
one's total environment.20 Second, one must be aware of the 
17 Aristotle, NE 1094b9 
18 Aristotle, ~ 1142b27-30. 
19 Takatura Ando, Aristotle's Theory of Practical 
Cognition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 265. 
20 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 338. 
good of the deliberation for its own sake.21 Finally, the 
choice made as a result of the good deliberation must be 
made for its own sake. That is, the person of virtuous 
character chooses virtuous conduct because such conduct is 
virtuous. It is in making this choice for the good that the 
highest good is achieved. 
Eudaimonia as the ultimate end for Aristotle 
This highest good, or eudaimonia, has been variously 
called happiness or well being or living well, but none of 
these can give the full meaning of the function of eudai-
monia in the person. That is, eudaimonia is not some static 
point that is reached once and for all, an accomplishment. 
Rather it is the continual act, the ongoing accomplishing 
that is human nature, something for which it is our nature 
to strive, and in the striving we realize our nature more 
fully. 
Self-realization is not the nature of the greatest 
good discussed by Aristotle, however. As Edel points out: 
••• ethics in the Aristotelian tradition is not a 
separate province in which a freely willing moral 
agent struggles within himself in a fretful effort 
to do his duty or conform to a universally binding 
moral law or even calculate profit and loss.22 
21 Ibid., p. 341. 
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22 Abraham Edel, Aristotle and His Philosophy (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p. 251. 
This rejection of individualism is, of course,_ consistent 
with Dewey's view that no single contemporary moral theory 
is sufficient " ••• as the injunction to each self on every 
possible occasion to identify the self with a new growth 
that is possible ••. n23 
Can some ultimate end of growth in the moral life be 
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attained, however? Aristotle does deal with this question at 
the end of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Although it is through the realization of our natures 
as social "animals" that the human good is accomplished, we 
also are, on Aristotle's view, the only animals that think. 
Thinking or reasoning is necessary for practical wisdom, but 
there also is a speculative reasoning that can be engaged in 
for its own sake. This is sophia, wisdom that is " ... found 
in the highest degree in the activity which is concerned 
with theoretical knowledge. 11 24 This is the activity of the 
"self-sufficient" and wise person engaged in using the best 
capacity of the human person, reason. "Hence the best 
activity of all is the best activity of the best capa-
city, n25 and Aristotle appears to have presented us with an 
ultimate end -- the use of reason, study, contemplation. 
23 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 308. 
24 Abraham Edel, Aristotle (New York: Dell Publishing 
Co., Inc., 1962), p. 416. 
25 Irwin, NE, note to 1177a14, p. 378. 
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Yet almost immediately, Aristotle says that although 
this activity of study is the highest single good of all, it 
still does "not contain all the goods needed to make life 
lack nothing.n26 If it were the only and ultimate end we 
would be as gods, which we are not. Our human nature 
requires the physical and the social as well, for it is "not 
self-sufficient for engaging in study; our body must be 
healthy and we must have food and generally be cared for."27 
Eudaimonia is the highest good of all, but is found in the 
whole of human nature, man's contemplative self and his 
practical self. 
We learn and actively practice the "science" of 
ethics as part of our participation in the "science" of 
politics, the human community. The growth of the good in the 
person striving for the good is inseparable from the growth 
of the good in the community. Since all human life is a 
process of growth it is this growth of the good in conduct 
and character in the person and in society that is the 
ultimate good. If this ultimate good is the end, the telos 
of Aristotle's ethics, then it can be said that growth is 
the end of his ethics. 
26 Irwin, NE, note to 1177a27, p. 379. 
27 Edel, Aristotle, p. 419. 
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Conclusion 
The teleology of Dewey's ethics and of Aristotle's is 
the same in that both arise from human experience. Each 
requires a process by which the meaning of experience is 
recognized, understood, and used to continue the process. 
Finally, the process itself is one of growth in morality, 
the good for the person and for society, that is, in effect, 
an end in itself. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that for Dewey, as for Aristotle, 
human acts include the element of virtue in both the conduct 
• 
and consequence of action as well as the character of the 
agent. However, it is not simply that persons are virtuous 
if their conduct is virtuous and the consequences of that 
conduct is virtuous. That is, for each philosopher the 
morality or good of the act begins with the inherent good of 
human nature realized in the individual acting with full 
awareness and understanding of that good in relation to 
other persons. For Dewey, Neil Coughlin says, "the defini-
tion of virtue that seems eventually to have most satisfied 
him was conduct that served society's end. 11 1 
As a social animal we learn of the good by contact 
with other humans. We become virtuous by becoming more of 
the best of being human, through good habituation, incul-
cation in customary morality, and by using our power of 
reason. Thus, like Aristotle's phronesis, Dewey's concept of 
reflective morality requires the person to weigh and discard 
alternatives while striving for that resolution in which the 
good inheres, using the conclusion to lead into a continua-
tion of the process. 
1 Neil Coughlin, Young John Dewey (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 85. 
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For both Aristotle and Dewey moral reasoning, that 
is, the practice of ethics, has a social function rather 
than a formal function, the systematization of rules for the 
individual. Aristotle certainly does not offer a great deal 
of practical guidance for actually solving moral problems 
because he is: 
•.• more concerned with identifying the right states 
of character than with specifying the range of 
actions associated with them. He thinks detailed 
ethical instructions require reference to social and 
political conditions, and these are discussed in the 
Politics.2 
In the same way, Dewey maintains that there is: 
... [no) final and unquestionable knowledge on which 
we can fall back in order to settle automatically 
every moral problem ••. [for) this would involve 
commitment to a dogmatic theory of morals.3 
Dewey calls his method "experimental" in that his reflective 
morality, like Aristotle's dialectic, involves the observa-
tion of particular situations. 
The society in which Dewey lived was one in which 
there was greater change than Aristotle could have imagined. 
In consequence the demand for a truly ref lec-
ti ve, a thoughtful, morality was never so great. 
This is almost the only alternative to either 
moral drifting or else to unreasoning and 
dogmatic insistence upon arbitrary, formal 
codes ••• 4 
2 Irwin,tr., ~, p. xix. 
3 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 329. 
4 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 233. 
The qoal is qood conduct, a good life, a qood society, for 
both Dewey and Aristotle. That is, a life that is good in 
itself, something worth strivinq for its own sake. To this 
end reconstruction of experience is not only the means but 
also the end that Dewey calls qrowth, toward which, like 
Aristotle's eudaimonia, human acts are directed. 
Finally, both for Dewey and for Aristotle ethics are 
teleological in their orientation to both the goals of the 
individual and of society. And for both the end is growth. 
The points in the two structures and the processes connec-
ting them have been identified in Aristotle and in John 
Dewey's 1932 Ethics. The resulting structures are similar 
enough to claim that Dewey's 1932 Ethics is Aristotelian. 
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